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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Scalia is renowned for his conservative stance on the Eighth
Amendment and prisoners’ rights. 1 Justice Scalia held that the Eighth
Amendment incorporates no proportionality requirement of any nature
regarding the type and duration of punishment which the state can inflict
on criminal offenders. 2 Justice Scalia has also been labelled as “one of

* Swinburne University, School of Law, Melbourne.
** Dean of the Deakin Law School, Melbourne.
1. He has also been described as “the purest archetype of the conservative legal movement
that began in the 1960s in reaction to the Warren Court.” JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL:
THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 146 (2009).
2. Richard Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, And The Eighth
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative To What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 573 (2004).
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the Justices least likely to support a prisoner’s legal claim” 3 and as
adopting, because of his originalist orientation, “a restrictive view of the
existence of prisoners’ rights.” 4
The criticism of Justice Scalia’s approach to the Eighth
Amendment, so far as it relates to the harshness of criminal sanctions, is
wide-ranging and sometimes verging on the disparaging. Mugambi Jouet
states:
As draconian punishments became the norm over the last three
decades, the Supreme Court largely rubber-stamped these practices.
Justice Scalia played a key role in this process, as his hardline stances
on criminal punishment significantly contributed to mass incarceration,
numerous executions, and systemic racial discrimination. Scalia was
an outspoken supporter of harsh punishments and wanted the court to
take an even more hands-off attitude toward so-called “tough on
crime” laws. 5

Thus, the overwhelming weight of prevailing sentiment is that Justice
Scalia was a foe of criminal law and procedure to the extent that this is
associated with a moderate or lenient approach to the punishment of
offenders.
A closer examination of the seminal judgments in these areas and
the jurisprudential nature of the principle of proportionality and rights
(including prisoners’ rights) arguably put this characterization in a
different light. While Justice Scalia may have been a foe of a move to
less harsh sentencing and expansive rights to prisoners, there is an
underlying coherence to some of his key decisions that is underpinned
by the provisions he was applying and, even more so, the logical and
normative contents or vagueness of the concepts under consideration.
Proportionality, in its crudest form, is the view that the “seriousness
of the crime be matched by the harshness of the penalty.” 6 The concept
is intuitively appealing but no jurisprudential analysis has yet been
capable of injecting sufficient content into the ideal such that it can be
used to meaningfully influence sentencing outcomes. At the abstract

3. Christopher E. Smith, The Changing Supreme Court and Prisoners’ Rights, 44 IND. L.
REV. 853, 869 (2011).
4. Id. at 872.
5. Mugambi Jouet, The Human Toll of Antonin Scalia’s Time on the Court, SLATE (Feb. 17,
2016,
6:32
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2016/02/
antonio_scalia_made_america_s_incarceration_problem_worse.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2016).
6. Mirko Bagaric & Sandeep Gopalan, Saving the United States From Lurching To Another
Sentencing Crisis: Taking Proportionality Seriously and Implementing Fair Fixed Penalties, 60 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 169, 189 (2016).
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level, it is not easy to dispute that rights are important and that all
people, including prisoners, should enjoy the greatest possible array and
expression of rights. However, there is no logical or jurisprudential
pathway that has been developed to coherently and firmly transpose
abstract ideals in the form of rights into concrete entitlements, especially
in a prison setting where the common good (often in the form of
community protection) is typically the consideration that compels the
prison term in the first place.
Thus, while Justice Scalia may have been a foe of the principle of
proportionality and prisoners’ rights, arguably this was at least in part
because of a duty borne by the need for intellectual and judicial rigour as
opposed to by design. We leave that for readers to decide.
In this Article, we examine the key judgments of Justice Scalia
relating to the Eighth Amendment, with a focus on the concept of
proportionate punishment and prisoners’ rights. 7 We conclude that his
judgments in these areas were “unfriendly” to offenders. We then
analyze the logical and normative underpinnings of the principle of
proportionality and prisoners’ rights and suggest that the nebulous nature
of these concepts, especially when viewed against the backdrop of the
legal provisions he was considering, entailed that a more expansive view
of proportionality was not necessarily jurisprudentially sound. In relation
to prisoners’ rights, our analysis is less agreeable with the approach
taken by Justice Scalia. He had an influential role in developing a
doctrinally flawed aspect of the test for establishing a breach of the
Eighth Amendment. The requirement that prisoners need to establish
that prison officials were subjectively aware of a breach of the Eighth
Amendment stems from an erroneous understanding of the nature of
punishment. However, this requirement is ultimately not the central
reason for the existence of what is, in our view, often unacceptably harsh
prison conditions. Rather, the harsh conditions stem from the high bar
that needs to be crossed to establish that prison conditions are cruel.
Justice Scalia did not set the height of that bar.
In Part II of this Article, we examine Justice Scalia’s interpretation
of the Eighth Amendment, with a focus on the proportionality principle.
This is followed by an exploration of the nature of the proportionality
principle and its logical and normative underpinnings. In Part III, we
analyze the manner in which Justice Scalia approached the issue of

7. The prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment can obviously be violated in
circumstances beyond disproportionate punishment; however, we focus on the principle of
proportionality given the breadth of its potential application.
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prisoners’ rights against the backdrop of the Eighth Amendment. In the
concluding remarks, we provide an overview regarding the doctrinal
coherency and persuasiveness of his judgments in these areas.
II. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND THE PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLE
This Part begins by briefly examining the role the proportionality
principle has played in the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. After introducing the principle, this Part discusses the
roots of the proportionality principle in Eighth Amendment case law and
traces the principle’s development throughout the early twentieth
century. Next, this Part introduces Justice Scalia’s rejection of the
proportionality principle, the progression of his thought on the principle,
and his arguments against the principle. Thereafter, this Part seeks to
demonstrate that each of Justice Scalia’s reasons for rejecting the
proportionality principle—its incongruence with current punishment and
sentencing objectives, its lack of susceptibility to intelligible application,
and the ability to deprive it of force by pursuing the alternative goals of
deterrence and community protection—are doctrinally sound,
persuasive, and correct.
A. Overview of the Role of the Proportionality Principle Within the
Scope of the Eighth Amendment
A logical starting point in the application of the proportionality
principle is recognizing that the Supreme Court has held that the
principle is incorporated within the Eighth Amendment’s prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishment. Importantly, however, the
jurisprudence regarding the meaning and scope of the principle is
unclear, partly because proportionalism is not the only protective
concept that the Supreme Court has held as springing from the Eighth
Amendment. Meghan Ryan notes that since 1958, the Supreme Court
has stated that the focus of the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment is on protecting the dignity of the person. 8 In Trop v. Dulles,
the Supreme Court held:
The exact scope of the constitutional phrase “cruel and unusual” has
not been detailed by this Court, but the basic policy reflected in these

8. Meghan Ryan, Taking Dignity Seriously: Excavating the Backdrop of the Eighth
Amendment, U. ILL. L. REV. 2129, 2141 (2016); see also Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 65, 86 (2011); Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160
U. PA. L. REV. 169, 203 (2011).
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words is firmly established in the Anglo-American tradition of
criminal justice. The phrase in our Constitution was taken directly
from the English Declaration of Rights of 1688, and the principle it
represents can be traced back to the Magna Carta. The basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands
to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized
standards. 9

Ryan suggests that the dignity requirement is reflected in two
considerations: proportionality and humanness. 10 In relation to
proportionalism, for more than one hundred years, the Supreme Court
has held that the concept is embedded within the Eighth Amendment. 11
Only Justices Thomas and Scalia have rejected this position; only Justice
Scalia has set out reasons in support of this proposition. 12
Ian Farrell notes that there are two core reasons for Justice Scalia’s
rejection of the proportionality doctrine. 13 The first stems from his
originalist approach to interpreting the Constitution. According to
Justice Scalia, proportionalism is not supported by a historical analysis
of the Eighth Amendment. 14 The second stems from a philosophical
objection. 15 While we agree with Farrell’s broad classifications
regarding Justice Scalia’s approach to proportionality, we contend that
Justice Scalia’s approach is more doctrinally sound than is generally
accepted.

9. 356 U.S. 86, 99-100 (1958); see also Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014);
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
10. Ryan, supra note 8, at 2133.
11. The Court first recognized that proportionality was a component of the Eighth
Amendment in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910). In Coker v. Georgia, the Court
held that punishments that are grossly disproportionate are prohibited. 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
Further, as noted by Sharon Dolovich, “[t]he prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment has been
held to forbid punishments that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the crime; that are ‘totally without
penological justification;’ that ‘involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’; and that are
inconsistent with ‘evolving standards of decency.’” In its most basic sense, to be cruel is to inflict
unjustified suffering, and each of these principles may be read as condemning those criminal
punishments that do just that.” Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth
Amendment, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 883-84 (2009).
12. Ian P. Farrell, Gilbert & Sullivan and Scalia: Philosophy, Proportionality, and the Eighth
Amendment, 55 VILL. L. REV. 321, 330 (2010).
13. Farrell distinguishes between the originalist and historical claim, but logically they are
connected. Id.
14. Id. at 332.
15. Id. at 332-33.
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B. Origins of the Proportionality Principle Within the Scope of the
Eighth Amendment
We now analyze Justice Scalia’s reasons for rejecting
proportionalism in the context of discussing the manner in which
proportionality has been recognized and applied by the Supreme Court.
Because, “in some respects, the Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence is a bit of a mess,” this analysis involves a degree of
interpretation and judgment. 16 Farrell makes a similar observation:
While nearly a century has passed since the Court first relied upon the
proportionality principle, the Court has by no means spoken with one
voice on the issue. Rather, the Court’s Justices have demonstrated
chronic disagreement about the precise contours of the principle, and
about its application in specific cases and classes of cases. But despite
this ongoing disagreement about what “proportionality” means, there
has been near consensus about the more basic issue: namely, that the
Eighth Amendment does in fact require proportionality—whatever that
may be—between punishment and the crime for which it is imposed. 17

Nevertheless, it is possible to set out the broad parameters of
proportionality that have been established and to identify Justice Scalia’s
key objections to the principle.
The United States Supreme Court first considered the concept of
proportionality in the context of the Eighth Amendment in Weems v.
United States. Paul Weems was a United States Coast Guard Official
who was charged with falsifying a public and official document with the
intent to deceive and defraud the United States government. 18 Weems
entered into his cash book that he paid out the sums of 208 and 408
pesos as wages to certain employees of the lighthouse service, when, in
fact, he did not pay out the money. 19 Weems was convicted and
sentenced to fifteen years in prison and to pay a fine of 4,000 pesetas. 20
As part of his sentence, he was to “always carry a chain at the ankle,
hanging from the wrists; . . . be employed at hard and painful labor,
and . . . receive no assistance whatsoever from without the institution.” 21

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
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Weems filed a writ of error with the U.S. Supreme Court, claiming that
the charges against him were improper and that his conviction should be
overturned. 22 The Court held that the punishments imposed on Weems
were cruel and unusual and reversed the judgment with directions to
dismiss the proceedings. 23 So far as proportionality is concerned, the
Court noted that:
In interpreting the Eighth Amendment, it will be regarded as a precept
of justice that punishment for crime should be graduated and
proportioned to the offense. . . . What constitutes a cruel and unusual
punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment has not been exactly
defined, and no case as heretofore occurred in this court calling for an
exhaustive definition. . . . The Eighth Amendment is progressive, and
does not prohibit merely the cruel and unusual punishments known in
1689 and 1787, but may acquire wider meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by humane justice . . . . 24

Following Weems, the Court would take on a number of cases, the result
of which was the enshrinement of the proportionality principle as an
integral element of the Eighth Amendment.
The Supreme Court next considered the concept of proportionality
as a component of the Eighth Amendment in Robinson v California. In
this case, the defendant was convicted in California state court for
violation of a criminal statute that made it an offense for a person to be
addicted to the use of narcotics.25 The defendant was stopped by the
police who observed his arms and saw “what appeared to be numerous
needle marks and a scab which was approximately three inches below
the crook of the elbow” on the defendant’s left arm. 26 Testifying on his
own behalf, the defendant denied that he had ever used narcotics or had
been addicted to their use. 27 He explained that the marks on his arms
resulted from an allergic condition contracted during his military service,
and two witnesses corroborated this testimony. 28 The Supreme Court
held that “a state law which imprisons a person thus afflicted as a
criminal, even though he has never touched any narcotic drug within the
State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a cruel and

22. Id. at 357.
23. Id. at 382.
24. Id. at syllabus.
25. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660 (1962).
26. Id. at 661.
27. Id. at 662.
28. Id.
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unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 29In his
concurrence, Justice Douglas stated:
A punishment out of all proportion to the offense may bring it within
the ban against “cruel and unusual punishment.” (citation omitted). So
may the cruelty of the method of punishment, as, for example,
disemboweling a person alive. (citation omitted). But the principle that
would deny power to exact capital punishment for a petty crime would
also deny power to punish a person by fine or imprisonment for being
sick. 30

Robinson ushered in modern proportionality analysis, and further
discussions of the role of proportionality in constitutional punishment
would soon follow.
The role of proportionality in the context of the Eighth Amendment
was further elaborated upon in Solem v Helm, where the offender had
been punished with imprisonment for life without parole for the crime of
uttering a no-account check. 31 Although the actual sentence for the
crime was five years imprisonment and a fine of $5,000, based on South
Dakota’s recidivist statute, Helm’s punishment was ratcheted up to life
imprisonment without parole. 32 Justice Powell, writing the majority
opinion, noted that “[t]he principle that a punishment should be
proportionate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in
common law jurisprudence. In 1215 three chapters of Magna Carta were
devoted to the rule that ‘amercements’ may not be excessive.” 33 He
rejected the State’s contention that proportionality does not apply to
imprisonment, pointing out that the:
[C]onstitutional language itself suggests no exception for
imprisonment. We have recognized that the Eighth Amendment
29. Id. at 667.
30. Id. at 676.
31. 463 U.S. 277, 281 (1983). The Court also touched on proportionality as a component of
the Eighth Amendment in Gregg v. Georgia, where the Court held that the death penalty for the
crime of murder does not violate the Eighth (or Fourteenth) Amendment. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In
this case, although the Court held that the Eighth Amendment proscribes grossly disproportionate
punishment, there was no detailed analysis of the concept. The Court relevantly held: “[f]inally, we
must consider whether the punishment of death is disproportionate in relation to the crime for which
it is imposed. There is no question that death, as a punishment, is unique in its severity and
irrevocability. (citation omitted). When a defendant’s life is at stake, the Court has been particularly
sensitive to insure that every safeguard is observed. (citation omitted). But we are concerned here
only with the imposition of capital punishment for the crime of murder, and, when a life has been
taken deliberately by the offender, we cannot say that the punishment is invariably disproportionate
to the crime. It is an extreme sanction, suitable to the most extreme of crimes.” Id. at 187.
32. Solem, 463 U.S. at 281-83.
33. Id. at 284.
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imposes “parallel limitations” on bail, fines, and other
punishments . . . . It would be anomalous indeed if the lesser
punishment of a fine and the greater punishment of death were both
subject to proportionality analysis, but the intermediate punishment of
imprisonment were not. There is also no historical support for such an
exception. The common law principle incorporated into the Eighth
Amendment clearly applied to prison terms. 34

The Court went on to hold that Eighth Amendment proportionality
analysis “should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity
of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
jurisdictions.” 35
According to Justice Powell, the first element could be evaluated
using “widely shared views as to the relative seriousness of crimes,”
such as the fact that “nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes
marked by violence or the threat of violence,” and by referring to
“accepted principles” utilized by courts to assess the “harm caused or
threatened to the victim or society.” 36 In recognizing that “a lesser
included offense should not be punished more severely than the greater
offense,” that “attempts are less serious than completed crimes,” and that
“an accessory after the fact should not be subject to a higher penalty than
the principal,” the absolute magnitude of the crime may be relevant. 37
The Court accepted that in order to apply its test, a court would have to

34. Id. at 288-89.
35. Id. at 292. In Harmelin v. Michigan, Justice Scalia conceded that the third element could
be applied with “clarity and ease” but dismissed it as irrelevant: “That a State is entitled to treat with
stern disapproval an act that other States punish with the mildest of sanctions follows a fortiori from
the undoubted fact that a State may criminalize an act that other States do not criminalize at all.
Indeed, a State may criminalize an act that other States choose to reward—punishing, for example,
the killing of endangered wild animals for which other States are offering a bounty. What greater
disproportion could there be than that? ‘Absent a constitutionally imposed uniformity inimical to
traditional notions of federalism, some State will always bear the distinction of treating particular
offenders more severely than any other State.’” 501 U.S. 957, 989-90 (1991).
36. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292-93. This first element was severely attacked by Justice Scalia in
Harmelin: “[W]hether it is a ‘grave’ offense merely to possess a significant quantity of drugs—
thereby facilitating distribution, subjecting the holder to the temptation of distribution, and raising
the possibility of theft by others who might distribute — depends entirely upon how odious and
socially threatening one believes drug use to be. Would it be ‘grossly excessive’ to provide life
imprisonment for ‘mere possession’ of a certain quantity of heavy weaponry? If not, then the only
issue is whether the possible dissemination of drugs can be as ‘grave’ as the possible dissemination
of heavy weapons. Who are we to say no? The Members of the Michigan Legislature, and not we,
know the situation on the streets of Detroit.” 501 U.S. at 988.
37. Solem, 463 U.S. at 293.
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compare prison terms:
For sentences of imprisonment, the problem is not so much one of
ordering, but one of line-drawing. It is clear that a 25-year sentence
generally is more severe than a 15-year sentence, but in most cases it
would be difficult to decide that the former violates the Eighth
Amendment while the latter does not. Decisions of this kind, although
troubling, are not unique to this area. 38

Applying its objective criteria, the court found that the punishment
imposed on Helm violated the Eighth Amendment. 39
C. Justice Scalia’s Rejection of the Proportionality Principle
In Harmelin v. Michigan, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court was
highly critical of the reasoning in Solem. 40 In Harmelin, the defendant
was convicted of possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine and
sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of
parole. 41 Harmelin argued that this punishment was significantly
disproportionate to the crime he was convicted of and that it constituted
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 42 The
Supreme Court affirmed Harmelin’s conviction and noted that the
Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality guarantee.43
Engaging in an extensive historical analysis, Justice Scalia wrote that:
[W]e think it most unlikely that the English Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause was meant to forbid “disproportionate”
punishments. There is even less likelihood that proportionality of
punishment was one of the traditional “rights and privileges of
Englishmen” apart from the Declaration of Rights, which happened to
be included in the Eighth Amendment. 44

For Scalia, “to use the phrase ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ to describe
a requirement of proportionality would have been an exceedingly vague
and oblique way of saying what Americans were well accustomed to

38. Id. at 294.
39. Id. at 303. For further discussion regarding the Supreme Court’s analysis regarding the
Eighth Amendment and proportionality, see Richard Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences
Under Federal and State Constitutions, 11 J. OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 39, 49-53 (2008)
[hereinafter Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences].
40. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 977.
41. Id. at 961.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 996.
44. Id. at 974.
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saying more directly.” 45
Importantly, according to Justice Scalia, the concept of
proportionality is too vague to provide meaningful guidance regarding
the outer limits of permissible penalties. He stated:
There are no adequate textual or historical standards to enable judges
to determine whether a particular penalty is disproportional. The first
two of the factors that Solem found relevant — the inherent gravity of
the defendant’s offense and the sentences imposed for similarly grave
offenses in some jurisdictions — fail for lack of an objective standard
of gravity. Since, as the statutes Americans have enacted in different
times and places demonstrate, there is enormous variation of opinion
as to what offenses are serious, the proportionality principle is an
invitation for judges to impose their own subjective values. 46

In the view of Justice Scalia, the Eighth Amendment’s proscription was
about the modes of punishment and not disproportionality. 47
Justice Kennedy wrote a separate concurring opinion finding that
the Eighth Amendment “encompasses a narrow proportionality
principle.” 48 According to Justice Kennedy, “[t]he Eighth Amendment
does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence.
Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly
disproportionate’ to the crime.” 49 Also notable was Justice White’s
dissent, where he opined that a court’s proportionality analysis “should
be guided by objective criteria, including: the gravity of the offense and
the harshness of the penalty; 50 the sentences imposed on other criminals
in the same jurisdiction; and the sentences imposed for commission of
the same crime in other jurisdictions.” 51
This confusing state of affairs received fresh attention in Ewing v.
California, where the Court affirmed the Harmelin test and reiterated the
narrow proportionality principle contained in the Eighth Amendment. 52
To this end, a majority of the Court was heavily influenced by Justice
Kennedy’s opinion in Harmelin. In Ewing, the defendant was convicted
in California state court of felony grand theft and sentenced to twenty45. Id. at 977.
46. Id. at syllabus.
47. Id. at 985.
48. Id. at 997.
49. Id. at 1001.
50. For Justice Kennedy, “intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate
only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence
imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Id. at 1005.
51. Id. at 1018.
52. 538 U.S. 11 (2003).
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five years to life under the state’s three strikes law.53 Under California’s
three strikes law, a defendant who is convicted of a felony and who has
previously been convicted of two or more serious or violent felonies
must receive an indeterminate life imprisonment term. 54 The defendant
had previously been convicted of two or more serious or violent felonies,
and while out on parole for one of those convictions, he was convicted
for stealing three golf clubs worth $399 a piece. 55 The defendant argued
that his sentence of twenty-five years to life was grossly disproportionate
to the crime committed. 56
The Court noted that California enacted the three strikes law for
individuals who have repeatedly engaged in serious or violent crimes
and whose conduct has not been deterred by more conventional
punishment approaches for the purpose of isolating those individuals
from society to protect public safety. 57 The Supreme Court held that
California properly enacted the statute upon determining that recidivism
among criminals presents a serious concern for public safety. 58 The
Court further noted that the Eighth Amendment does not require strict
proportionality between crime and sentence, but that it forbids only
extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime.59
Therefore, the Supreme Court held that the defendant’s sentence of
twenty-five years to life under the three strikes law was not grossly
disproportionate and thus not in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 60
Justice O’Connor elaborated on the application of the test to the
facts:
In weighing the gravity of Ewing’s offense, we must place on the
scales not only his current felony, but also his long history of felony
recidivism. . . . [in order] to accord proper deference to the policy
judgments that find expression in the legislature’s choice of sanctions.
In imposing a three strikes sentence, the State’s interest is not merely
punishing the offense of conviction, or the “triggering” offense: “It is
in addition the interest . . . in dealing in a harsher manner with those
who by repeated criminal acts have shown that they are simply
incapable of conforming to the norms of society as established by its
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
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criminal law.” (citation omitted). To give full effect to the State’s
choice of this legitimate penological goal, our proportionality review
of Ewing’s sentence must take that goal into account. 61

The Court noted that “Ewing’s is not ‘the rare case in which a threshold
comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to
an inference of gross disproportionality,’” and held that a sentence of
twenty-five years for stealing three golf clubs was not grossly
disproportionate. 62
Although Justice Scalia ultimately concurred in the Court’s
judgment, he was unimpressed with the Court’s reliance on
proportionality in reaching its decision. According to him:
Proportionality . . . is inherently a concept tied to the penological goal
of retribution. “It becomes difficult even to speak intelligently of
‘proportionality,’ once deterrence and rehabilitation are given
significant weight,” (citation omitted) not to mention giving weight to
the purpose of California’s three strikes law: incapacitation. In the
present case, the game is up once the plurality has acknowledged that
“the Constitution does not mandate adoption of any one penological
theory,” and that a “sentence can have a variety of justifications, such
as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation. 63

He went on to destroy the plurality’s reasoning:
Having completed [the first step of its test] (by a discussion which, in
all fairness, does not convincingly establish that 25 years-to-life is a
“proportionate” punishment for stealing three golf clubs), the plurality
must then add an analysis to show that “Ewing’s sentence is justified
by the State’s public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring
recidivist felons.” 64

Justice Scalia pointed out that under the plurality’s explanation, the
Court is not actually undertaking a proportionality analysis but reading
in a requirement that “all punishment should reasonably pursue the
multiple purposes of the criminal law.” 65 The plurality’s inability to
sustain its holding that twenty-five years imprisonment is a
proportionate punishment for stealing three golf clubs on any intelligible
logic illustrates the current state of judicial understanding of the concept.
61. Id. at 29.
62. Id. at 30.
63. Id at 31.
64. Id at 31-32. (“[W]hy that has anything to do with the principle of proportionality is a
mystery.”).
65. Id. at 32.
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In summary, the Supreme Court has held that proportionality is an
aspect of the Eighth Amendment. Justice Scalia rejected this proposition.
However, in pragmatic terms, the disagreement is more abstract than
real. Proportionalism has rarely been invoked by the Court for striking
down a sentence, especially in the context of the length of prison
terms. 66 As noted by Richard Frase, “[o]f all the government measures
subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny, excessively long prison
sentences seem to receive the least favorable treatment, and are
governed by the most opaque standards.” 67
In relation to the rationale adopted by Justice Scalia for rejecting
proportionality, it is important to note that the above historical analysis,
implanted within an originalistic interpretive methodology, 68 did not,
however, provide an insurmountable obstacle for Justice Scalia injecting
proportionalism into the Eighth Amendment. This is because Justice
Scalia was not absolute in applying originalism and would deviate from
this approach where it would result in an outcome which was either
demonstrably unacceptable to contemporary values or in conflict with
the doctrine of stare decisis. In Ewing he stated:
In my concurring opinion in Harmelin v. Michigan, . . . I concluded
that the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual
punishments” was aimed at excluding only certain modes of
punishment, and was not a “guarantee against disproportionate
sentences.” Out of respect for the principle of stare decisis, I might
nonetheless accept the contrary holding of Solem v. Helm, . . .—that
the Eighth Amendment contains a narrow proportionality principle—if
I felt I could intelligently apply it. This case demonstrates why I
cannot. 69

Thus, the fundamental basis for Justice Scalia’s rejection of the
proportionality principle was jurisprudential, not historical or otherwise
tied to his originalist approach to constitutional interpretation. 70

66. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court held that it was unconstitutional to impose the death
penalty on offenders who committed the offense when they were minors. 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
However, this limitation was rooted in the nature of the penalty.
67. Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 39, at 63.
68. The originalistic approach by Justice Scalia is set out in BISKUPIC, supra note 1, at 146.
69. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31.
70. Ian Farrell uses the term philosophical. See Farrell, supra note 12.
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D. Analysis of the Persuasiveness of Justice Scalia’s Reasons for
Rejecting Proportionality- Retributivistic and Utilitarian Theories
of Punishment
1. Justice Scalia is Correct that Proportionality is Conventionally
Associated with Retributivism
There are two main of theories of punishment. As alluded to by
Justice Scalia above, one of the theories is retributivism. 71 The other is
utilitarianism, which is the view that while punishment is inherently bad
due to the pain it causes the wrongdoer, it is ultimately justified because
any harm to the wrongdoer is outweighed by the “good” consequences
stemming from it. 72 Traditional “good” consequences come in the form
of incapacitation (i.e., imprisoning offenders and thereby preventing
them from further offending), deterrence (discouraging the offender and
other people from further offending), and rehabilitation (inducing
positive attitudinal reform). 73
Retributive theories of punishment are not clearly defined, and it is
difficult to isolate a common thread running through theories carrying
this label. 74 All retributive theories assert that offenders deserve to suffer
and that the institution of punishment should inflict the suffering they
deserve. However, they provide divergent accounts of why criminals
deserve to suffer. 75 Despite this, there are three broad similarities shared
by retributive theories. 76
The first similarity is the principal justification for punishment:
only those who are blameworthy deserve punishment. Thus, punishment
is only justified, broadly speaking, in cases of deliberate wrongdoing. 77
The second commonality is that punishing criminals is just in itself; it
cannot be inflicted as a means of pursuing some other aim. Accordingly,
71. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31.
72. See Mirko Bagaric, In Defence of a Utilitarian Theory of Punishment: Punishing the
Innocent and the Compatibility of Utilitarianism and Rights, 24 AUSTRALIAN J. OF LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 95, 95-144 (1999) [hereinafter Bagaric, In Defence of a Utilitarian Theory of
Punishment].
73. See generally Mirko Bagaric & Kumar Amarasekara, The Errors of Retributivism, 24
MELB. U. L. REV. 124 (2000).
74. See TED HONDERICH, PUNISHMENT: THE SUPPOSED JUSTIFICATIONS 211 (rev. ed., 1984);
David Dolinko, Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment, 16 L.
& PHILOSOPHY 507, 507 (1997).
75. See, e.g., Anthony Duff & Andrew Von Hirsch, Responsibility, Retribution and the
“Voluntary”: A Response to Williams, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 103, 107 (1997).
76. J. L. Anderson, Reciprocity as a Justification for Retributivism, 16 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS
13, 13 (1997).
77. Id. at 13-14.
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the justification for punishment does not turn on the likely achievement
of desirable outcomes. It is justified even when “we are practically
certain that attempts [to attain consequentialist goals, such as deterrence
and rehabilitation] will fail.” 78 Thus, is it conventionally understood that
retributive theories are backward-looking, merely focusing on past
events in order to determine whether punishment is justified, which is in
contrast to utilitarianism, which is concerned only with the likely future
consequences of imposing punishment. The third unifying aspect of
most retributive theories is the claim that punishment must be equivalent
to the level of wrongdoing. 79 Thus, proportionalism is a built-in
definitional aspect of many retributive theories.
The role of proportionality within a retributive construct is further
illustrated by an overview of two influential retributive theories. The
retributive account that most clearly endorses the proportionality thesis
is the lex talionis or the “eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” approach to
punishment. This theory, however, provides little guidance regarding the
proper workings of proportionalism. The lex talionis theory has no clear
application in relation to most offenses: “what penalty would you inflict
on a rapist, a blackmailer, a forger, a dope peddler, a multiple murderer,
a smuggler, or a toothless fiend who has knocked somebody else’s teeth
out?” 80 It has been suggested that a more plausible interpretation of the
lex talionis theory is that the punishment and the crime should be equal
or equivalent. 81 However, even this approach does not illuminate the
actual content of the principle.
Although modern retributive theories are more nuanced,
proportionality still remains an indispensable aspect of the theories. One
of the leading retributive theories is that advanced by Andrew von
Hirsch. He contends that the principal justification of punishment is
censure— that is, to convey blame or reprobation to those who have
committed a wrongful act. 82 Von Hirsch believes that censuring holds
offenders responsible and accountable for their actions and that, by
giving them an opportunity to respond to their misdeeds through
acknowledging their wrongdoing in some form, it recognizes their moral
agency. 83 For von Hirsch, punishment has a dual objective; in addition to

78.
79.
80.
81.
(1987).
82.
83.
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censuring offenders, punishment is justified as a means of preventing
crime. Andrew von Hirsch believes that the following three steps justify
the proportionality principle within his theory of punishment:
1. The State’s sanctions against proscribed conduct should take a
punitive form; that is, visit deprivations in a manner that expresses
censure or blame.
2. The severity of a sanction expresses the stringency of the blame.
3. Hence, punitive sanctions should be arrayed according to the degree
of blameworthiness (i.e. seriousness) of the conduct. 84

Thus, the fulcrum around which retributive theories are grounded is
ensuring there is proportionality between the punishment and the crime.
It is equally clear that Justice Scalia was correct to assert that
proportionality is an entrenched aspect of retributive theories of
punishment.
2. Contemporary Sentencing Law Invokes Cardinal Utilitarian
Objectives
In addition to his keen observations concerning the role of
proportionality in retributive theories of punishment, Justice Scalia was
also correct to assert that sentencing law and practice pursues traditional
utilitarian objectives in the form of incapacitation, deterrence, and
rehabilitation (even though sentencing is not based on a coherent and
express philosophical theory of punishment). 85 A good illustration is
federal sentencing law. In the Federal Sentencing Guideline system, the
range for an offense is determined by reference to two main
considerations. The first is the offense level, which entails an assessment
of the seriousness of the offense (this often includes a number of
variables and, depending on the offense, can include the nature of any
injury caused or monetary amount involved). 86 The second is the
84. Id. at 15. The same three premises were advanced by Ashworth and Von Hirsch several
decades later in ANDREW VON HIRSCH & ANDREW ASHWORTH, PROPORTIONATE SENTENCING:
EXPLORING THE PRINCIPLES 135 (2005), with inconsequential changes to premise one.
85. This may still leave room for a more modest retributive approach to apply
proportionality, which is termed “limiting retributivism.” Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison
Sentences, supra note 39, at 41-42. However, for reasons discussed below, this theory of
proportionality like all such theories is unintelligible unless content is provided to the two limbs of
the principle.
86. See Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N (Nov. 1, 2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2015/GLMFull.pdf [hereinafter U.S
SENT’G COMM’N 2015]. For analysis and criticism of the Guidelines, see Amy Baron Evans,
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offender’s criminal history score, which is based on the seriousness of
the past offenses and the time that has elapsed since the prior
offending. 87
There are forty-three different offense levels, and the corresponding
penalties increase in relation to offense levels.88 An increase of six levels
approximately doubles the sentence. 89 Where the range includes a term
of imprisonment, the range is relatively narrow in that it cannot exceed
the minimum penalty by more than the greater of six months or twentyfive percent. 90 The objectives that the Guidelines seek to achieve are
clearly utilitarian in nature. The Guidelines Manual relevantly states:
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (Title II of the Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984) provides for the development of
guidelines that will further the basic purposes of criminal punishment:
deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation. The Act
delegates broad authority to the Commission to review and rationalize
the federal sentencing process. 91

Thus, there is little question that proportionality is most commonly
associated with a retributive theory of punishment and that
contemporary sentencing law and practice adopts objectives which are
commonly associated with a utilitarian theory of punishment. This
provides a strong foundation for Justice Scalia’s view that the discord
between the retributive approach to punishment and sentencing practice
is incompatible with proportionalism. However, this view is not
incontestably correct. Although proportionality has traditionally been
thought to have little or no role in a utilitarian theory of punishment, on
closer analysis, there is arguably scope for the principle of
proportionality within a utilitarian approach to punishment and
sentencing. 92

Litigating Mitigating Factors: Departures, Variances, and Alternatives to Incarceration, NAT’L
RESOURCE
COUNS.
(2010),
https://www.fd.org/docs/trainingmaterials/2012/MT2012/Litigating_Mitigating_Factors.pdf.
87. See U.S SENT’G COMM’N 2015, supra note 86; see also Baron Evans, supra note 86.
88. See U.S SENT’G COMM’N 2015, supra note 86.
89. See id. at 11.
90. See id. at 2.
91. See id. at 1.
92. See K. G. Armstrong, The Retributivist Hits Back, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 33-34
(S. E. Grupp ed., 1971); infra Part II.
SENT’G

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

19

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 5

320

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:301

3. Possible Doctrinal Misgivings Regarding the Separation
Between Utilitarianism and Proportionalism
While the notion of proportionality may appear to be incompatible
with utilitarian theories of punishment, proportionality need not be
regarded as wholly inconsistent with utilitarian objectives of
punishment. Influential utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham argued
in favor of the proportionality principle on the basis that if crimes are to
be committed, it is preferable that offenders commit less serious rather
than more serious ones. 93 In his view, sanctions should be graduated
commensurate with the seriousness of the offense so that those disposed
to crime will opt for less serious offenses. In the absence of
proportionality, potential offenders would not be deterred from
committing serious offenses any more than minor ones, and hence would
just as readily commit them. This argument, however, has been
persuasively criticized by Andrew von Hirsch. He points out that there is
no evidence that offenders make comparisons regarding the level of
punishment for various offenses. 94 Further, the weight of empirical
evidence suggests that the theory of marginal deterrence is flawed. There
is virtually no link between higher penalties and lower crime. 95 The most
effective way to reduce crime is to increase the likelihood that people
will be caught if they commit crime, as opposed to simply increasing
penalties. 96
For example, the National Research Council published a report in
2014 which analyzed a large number of studies that examined the
connection between harsh criminal sanctions and the crime rate and
noted that the weight of evidence does not support the view that harsh
93. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 165 (J. H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (1789); see also Frase, Limiting Excessive
Prison Sentences, supra note 39, at 44-46.
94. ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS
IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS 32 (1987).
95. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 139-40 (2014) [hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION]; Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in
the 1990s: Four Factors That Explain the Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES
163, 177 (2004) (estimating the increase in police numbers to be about fourteen percent). For further
discussion, see John E. Eck & Edward R. Maguire, Have Changes In Policing Reduced Violent
Crime? An Assessment Of The Evidence, in THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 207, 248 (Alfred
Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000); Raymond Paternoster, A Century of Criminal Justice:
Crimes and Punishment: So, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 100 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 799 (2010).
96. See, e.g., Levitt, supra note 95, at 177. See also Eck & Maguire, supra note 95, at 248;
Paternoster, supra note 95, at 799.
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penalties reduce crime. The Report states:
Ludwig and Raphael . . . find no deterrent effect of enhanced sentences
for gun crimes; Lee and McCrary . . . and Hjalmarsson . . . find no
evidence that the more severe penalties that attend moving from the
juvenile to the adult justice system deter offending; and Helland and
Tabarrok . . . find only a small deterrent effect of the third strike of
California’s three strikes law. As a consequence, the deterrent return to
increasing already long sentences is modest at best. 97

Yet, there is an alternative basis for injecting proportionalism into
utilitarianism.
It has been contended that proportionality is necessary to ensure
that the criminal justice system is not placed into disrepute.
Disproportionate sentences would, so the argument runs, offend the
principle that privileges and hardships ought to be distributed roughly in
accordance with the degree of merit or blame attributable to each
individual. 98 Violations of this principle lead to antipathy towards
institutions or practices, which condone such outcomes. Christopher
Harding and Richard Ireland, for example, believe:
Proportion in punishment . . . is a widely found and deeply rooted
principle in many penal contexts. It is . . . integral to many conceptions
of justice and as such the principle of proportion in punishment seen
generally acts to annul, rather than to exacerbate, social dysfunction. 99

Empirical evidence offers some support to this sentiment. After a 1984
study of approximately 1,500 people who lived in Chicago regarding
their contact with legal authorities, scholars noted that normative issues
are linked with compliance with the law. 100 From this study, there is
some evidence to support the argument that people do not merely obey
the law because it is in their self-interest to do so; they also obey the law
because they believe it is proper to do so. The judgment that it is
appropriate to obey the law is not only affected by the internal content of
the law, but by the attitude of the community towards those who enforce
the law. Thus, the perception that the content of the law is fair and
legitimate can make it more likely that laws will be observed.
Accordingly, there is a utilitarian foundation for proportionalism if
97. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 95, at 139.
98. This is similar to the concept of desert. However, unlike retributivist theories, it is based
on forward-looking considerations.
99. CHRISTOPHER HARDING & RICHARD W. IRELAND, PUNISHMENT: RHETORIC, RULE, AND
PRACTICE 205 (1989).
100. TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 107 (1990).
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the proportionalist ideal is so inherently ingrained in the human psyche
that non-observance of the doctrine will disincline individuals from
complying with legal norms. 101 In light of the above discussion, there is
theoretical merit and some evidence in support of this argument. While
this is a position that has in fact been endorsed by one of us, 102 it is not
the orthodox or mainstream understanding regarding the rationale for
proportionality. Thus, Justice Scalia’s view that proportionality is not an
aspect of the Eighth Amendment because the current sentencing
objectives are incompatible with a retributive theory of punishment
(which underpins proportionalism) is doctrinally correct so far as
conventional understandings regarding the rationale for proportionality
are concerned.
4. Theoretical Misgivings About Utilitarianism and
Proportionality do not Undermine Scalia’s Approach
Justice Scalia’s position, however, can be challenged if one adopts
what is, in our view, a more jurisprudentially progressive and reformist
position regarding the logical and normative scope for proportionality
within a principally utilitarian approach to sentencing. However, this
failure by Justice Scalia to adopt this theoretical position does not
constitute a persuasive criticism of his approach. The above theoretical
position regarding the overlap between proportionality and utilitarianism
is contentious, and it is not the role of a judge to shape the law according
to emerging but unproven academic arguments. In particular, such an
approach would run counter to the judicial conservatism which was a
hallmark of Justice Scalia’s approach to decision-making. 103

101. There is some scientific support for an intrinsic desire to punish. See Mirko Bagaric,
Scientific Proof that Humans Enjoy Punishing Wrongdoers: The Implications for Punishment and
Sentencing, 1 INT’L J. OF PUNISHMENT & SENT’G 98 (2005).
102. Mirko Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage that is Proportionality in Sentencing,
25 NEW ZEALAND UNIV. L. REV. 411 (2013) [hereinafter Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage
that is Proportionality in Sentencing].
103. It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine the desirability of this approach to legal
interpretation. However, for one of our views regarding the merits of an originalistic approach to
constitutional interpretation, see Mirko Bagaric, Originalism: Why Some Things Should Never
Change - Or at Least Not Too Quickly, 19 UNIV. OF TAS. L. REV. 173 (2000).
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E. The Unassailability of Justice Scalia’s Second Reason for Rejecting
Proportionality—Proportionality is not Sufficiently Intelligible to
Provide Pragmatic Guidance
1. Proportionality as Currently Understood is Vacuous
As noted above, there are two other reasons Justice Scalia provided
for rejecting the proportionality principle as being grounded within the
Eighth Amendment. The first of these is the most persuasive. According
to Justice Scalia, proportionality is unintelligible.104 Ostensibly, this
might seem untenable. Proportionality is widely endorsed and embraced.
It is a requirement of the sentencing regimes of ten states in the United
States, 105 and as we have seen, it is a core aspect of retributive theories
of punishment and has even been endorsed by some utilitarian
philosophers. 106 Proportionality is also a core principle that informs
(though it does not strongly influence) the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines. In addition to this, a survey of state sentencing law by
Thomas Sullivan and Richard Frase shows that at least nine states have
constitutional provisions relating to the prohibition of excessive
penalties or treatment (an endorsement of proportionalism), 107 and that
twenty‐two states have constitutional clauses which prohibit cruel and
unusual penalties, including eight states with a proportionate‐penalty
clause. 108 Despite this, it has been contended that proportionalism is a
vacuous concept: it exists in the abstract only, devoid of even the
sparsest of content.
The most obscure and problematic aspect of proportionality is that
there is no stable and clear manner in which the hardship of the
punishment can be matched to the severity of the crime. Jesper Ryberg,
in the course of his rigorous and probing analysis of the proportionality
principle, observes that one of the key criticisms of proportionalism is
that it “presupposes something which is not there, namely, some
objective measure of appropriateness between crime and punishment.” 109
104. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003).
105. This is discussed in Gregory S. Schneider, Note, Sentencing Proportionality in the States,
54 ARIZ. L. REV. 241 (2012) (focusing on the operation of the principle in Illinois, Oregon,
Washington, and West Virginia); see also E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & RICHARD S. FRASE,
PROPORTIONALITY PRINCIPLES IN AMERICAN LAW: CONTROLLING EXCESSIVE GOVERNMENT
ACTIONS 154 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
106. SULLIVAN & FRASE, supra note 105, at 157.
107. Id. at 154-55.
108. Id. at 154.
109. JESPER RYBERG, THE ETHICS OF PROPORTIONATE PUNISHMENT: A CRITICAL
INVESTIGATION 184 (2004); see also Ryan, supra note 8.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

23

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 5

324

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:301

He further notes that to give content to the theory, it is necessary to rank
crimes, rank punishments, and anchor the scales. 110
The vagaries associated with proportionalism are so pronounced
that it is verging on doctrinal and intellectual fiction to suggest that an
objective answer can be given to common sentencing dilemmas, such as
how many years imprisonment is equivalent to the pain felt by an assault
victim, or whether a robber should be dealt with by way of
imprisonment or fine, or the appropriate sanction for a drug trafficker.
There is no demonstrable violation of proportionality if a mugger,
robber, or drug trafficker is sentenced to either six to ten months or six
to ten years imprisonment. The fact that the principle can be so flexible
suggests that it is no principle at all, but rather a doctrinal expedient—a
sophistry invoked by courts (and legislatures) as a means of justifying
their intuitive sentencing impulses. The unstable and illusory nature of
proportionality is, in our view, one of the reasons that the Supreme Court
has consistently declined to invalidate crushing prison terms, even for
relatively minor offenses. As noted by Richard Frase:
As is well known, the Court has been very reluctant to invalidate
lengthy prison terms on Eighth Amendment grounds. Only one
prisoner, in Solem v. Helm, has won such a claim in modern times.
And in recent years the Court has upheld sentences of shocking
severity—life without parole for a first-time offender charged with
cocaine possession (admittedly, involving a very large quantity), and a
mandatory minimum prison term of twenty-five years to life for the
crime of shoplifting several golf clubs. 111

As such, Justice Scalia’s contention that the proportionality principle
provides little guidance in terms of recognizing Eighth Amendment
violations is premised on viable theoretical bases.
2. Justice Scalia’s Reasoning is Sound Notwithstanding
Compelling Theoretical Support for Proportionality
Despite infirmities with proportionality theories, such infirmities
should not give rise to the inference that it is not doctrinally feasible to
shore up the proportionality principle and inject it with concrete
meaning. To do so requires a fundamental reassessment of the principle.
The starting point is to identify its constituent features. Broken down to
its core elements, proportionality has two limbs: the seriousness of the

110.
111.

RYBERG, supra note 109, at 185.
See Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 39, at 57.
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crime and the harshness of the sanction. Further, the principle has a
quantitative component—the two limbs must be matched. In order for
the principle to be satisfied, the seriousness of the crime must be equal to
the harshness of the penalty.
While the complexity associated with operationalizing the principle
has been noted by numerous scholars, one of us has argued elsewhere
that there is one criterion which should be used to measure offense
severity and the hardship of a sanction: individual well-being. 112 The
type and degree of punishment imposed on offenders should cause them
to have their well-being set back by an amount equal to that which the
crime set back the well-being of the victim.
The main difficulty to this approach relates to mapping and
calculating the notion of well-being. There is admittedly a degree of
approximation involved in such an assessment. However, the level of
accuracy in making such determinations is increasing. The concept of
well-being has achieved such broad acceptance that, in some contexts, it
is replacing or complementing conventional and widely-accepted
economic indicia for evaluating human progress and achievement. The
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has
developed a “Better Life Index,” which attempts to set out and prioritize
the matters that are most essential for human “well-being.” 113 The index
lists eleven criteria for measuring life quality. 114 It allows nations to
develop their social and economic priorities, and has distinguished
between responses from men and women. It is apparent that men and
women have near identical priorities. From most to least important is:
life satisfaction, health, education, work-life balance, environment, jobs,
safety, housing, community, income, and civic engagement. 115 In order
to attain life satisfaction, key interests are the right to life, physical

112. Bagaric, Injecting Content into the Mirage that is Proportionality in Sentencing, supra
note 102. The approach has some similarity with the majority opinion of Justice Powell in Solem v.
Helm, who stated that the seriousness of the offense is determined by harm caused and the
defendant’s degree of culpability. 463 U.S. 277, 293-94 (1983); see also Frase, Limiting Excessive
Prison Sentences, supra note 39, at 58. However, lacking in this analysis is the criteria by which
harm is to be determined.
BETTER
LIFE
INDEX,
113. Create
Your
Better
Life
Index,
OECD
http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/#/11111111111 (last visited Jan. 9, 2017). These measures are
designed to be more informative than economic statistics, especially in the form of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP).
114. Id.
115. Mirko Bagaric, Proportionality in Sentencing: The Need to Factor in Community
Experience, Not Public Opinion, in POPULAR PUNISHMENT: ON THE NORMATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF
PUBLIC OPINION 76, 90 (Jesper Ryberg & Julian V. Roberts eds., 2014).
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integrity, liberty, and the right to property. 116
While relevant studies have not been conducted with a view to
providing insight into calculations of offense seriousness or sanction
severity, nevertheless, two tentative conclusions can be made regarding
the relevance of the studies to the concept of proportionalism.
First, property offenses—which deprive victims of wealth as
opposed to diminishing their personal security—are over-rated in terms
of their seriousness. Wealth has a far smaller impact on personal
happiness than a range of other factors, 117 and hence, the criminal justice
system should view these offenses less seriously. The main situation
where property offenses make a significant adverse impact on victims is
where they result in the victim living in a state of poverty. The second
conclusion that follows from the above analysis is that offenses that
imperil a person’s sense of security, or otherwise negatively affect a
person’s health and capacity to lead a free and autonomous life, should
be punished severely.
These conclusions are supported by studies that assess the impact of
different forms of crime on victims. The available data suggest that
victims of violent crime and sexual crime have their well-being more
significantly set back than victims of other types of crime. 118 For
example, one study showed that victims of violent crime, sexual crime in
particular, have difficulty being involved in intimate relationships,119
higher divorce rates, 120 diminished parenting skills (although this finding
was not universal), 121 lower levels of success in the employment
setting, 122 and much higher levels of unemployment. 123 Victims of
116. This is the trend of information emerging from the following works and extensive
research data in these works. See, e.g., Michael Argyle et al., Happiness as a Function of
Personality and Social Encounters, in RECENT ADVANCES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 189 (Joseph P. Forgas & J. Michael Innes eds., 1989); DAVID G.
MYERS, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS (1992); TIM KASSER, THE HIGH PRICE OF MATERIALISM
(2002); Martin E. P. Seligman & Mihaly Csikszentmilhayi, Positive Psychology: An Introduction,
55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 5 (2000); MARTIN E. P. SELIGMAN, AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS (2002). The
results of these studies are summarized in Mirko Bagaric & James McConvill, Goodbye Justice,
Hello Happiness: Welcoming Positive Psychology to the Law, 10 DEAKIN L. REV. 1 (2005). For
related readings, see this same edition of the Deakin Law Review, which is a thematic edition
regarding the link between law and happiness research.
117. Money Can’t Buy Happiness, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (June 14, 2011),
http://www.apa.org/news/press/releases/2011/06/buy-happiness.aspx (last visited Jan. 9, 2017).
118. Rochelle F. Hanson et al., The Impact of Crime Victimization on Quality of Life, 23 J.
TRAUMATIC STRESS 189 (2010).
119. Id. at 191-92.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 191.
122. Id. at 192; see also Mike Dixon et al., The Unequal Impact of Crime, INST. FOR PUB.
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property crimes likewise suffer reduced levels of well-being but at
generally less pronounced rates than victims of sexual and violent
crime. 124
The other side of the proportionality equation—measuring
punishment severity—is less contentious. Ryberg contends that this is
because of the underlying belief that the “answer is pretty
straightforward,” as imprisonment is clearly the harshest disposition. 125
As Ryberg notes, the answer would seem to rest on the “negative impact
on the well-being of the punished.” 126 To this end, it is clear that
imprisonment is the harshest commonly applied sanction because, as
discussed further below, it has a severe impact on the well-being of
offenders. 127
The final problem regarding proportionality is how to match the
severity of the punishment with the seriousness of the offense. In light of
the above discussion, this is, theoretically, relatively straightforward.
The type and degree of punishment imposed on offenders should set
their well-being back in an amount equal to that which the crime set
back the well-being of the victim. 128
The above approach assesses both the hardship of punishment and
the severity of the crime as they relate to well-being. This enables at
least a crude match to be made, which stems from a number of premises.
First, the crimes which have the most serious adverse consequences for
victims are assault and sexual offenses. Secondly, the adverse effects of
imprisonment seem to have been greatly undervalued. In light of this, a
reasonable starting point is that, generally, imprisonment should be
imposed only for sexual and violent offenses and most prison terms
should be reduced compared to those currently imposed. 129 Of course,
POL’Y RES. 26 (2006), http://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2011/05/
crimeshare_1500.pdf?noredirect=1.
123. Hanson et al., supra note 118, at 192.
124. See Adriaan J.M. Denkers & Frans Willem Winkel, Crime Victims’ Well-Being and Fear
in a Prospective and Longitudinal Study, 5 INT’L REV. VICTIMOLOGY 141, 155-56 (1998).
125. RYBERG, supra note 109, at 102.
126. Id. at 102-03.
127. See infra Part II.
128. This is in keeping with the approach of some other theorists. Von Hirsch asserts that an
interests analysis, similar to the living standard analysis he adopts for gauging crime seriousness,
should be used to estimate the severity of penalties. Andrew Von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Gauging
Criminal Harm: A Living-Standard Analysis, 11 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 34-35 (1991).
Ashworth states that proportionality at the outer limits “excludes punishments which impose far
greater hardships on the offender than does the crime on victims and society in general.” ANDREW
ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 97 (2d ed., 1995).
129. We suggest that most offenses should be dealt with in a manner which does not involve a
term of imprisonment and that imprisonment should be mainly reserved for serious sexual and
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this says nothing about the appropriate length of imprisonment for
certain categories of sexual and violent offenses. However, the default
position should be that most prison terms for these offenses should be
less than is currently the norm given that current sentencing practices
greatly underestimate the harshness of imprisonment. 130
Thus, while there is a tenable basis for injecting content into the
proportionality principle, this theory has not garnered broad acceptance,
and it has not been adopted into sentencing practice. It follows that
Justice Scalia’s position that proportionality is vacuous, so much so that
even concepts such as gross disproportionality are effectively
meaningless, is jurisprudentially sound and is, in fact, mandated by a
judicially conservative approach to legal interpretation and decisionmaking.
F. Proportionality can be Rendered Nugatory by the Pursuit of
Deterrence and/or Community Protection—Justice Scalia’s Third
Reason for Rejecting Proportionality is also Sound
Justice Scalia is also on firm conceptual ground regarding his last
reason for holding that proportionalism is not grounded in the Eighth
Amendment. According to Justice Scalia, the proportionality principle
cannot have a constitutional basis because it can be rendered nugatory
by the pursuit of other sentencing objectives. 131 As we have seen,
sentencing has a number of objectives. The three key sentencing aims
that justify longer penalties are incapacitation, general deterrence, and
specific deterrence. 132 These objectives can potentially justify sanctions
which are harsher than the seriousness of the offense, so much so that
they can logically and jurisprudentially overwhelm the proportionality
principle. It has even been asserted that the pursuit of utilitarian
sentencing goals is so powerful that, in some circumstances, it is
permissible to punish the innocent. To this end, a famous example is
H.J. McCloskey’s small-town sheriff scenario:
Suppose a sheriff [was] faced with the choice of either framing [an
African American] for a rape which had aroused white hostility to
[African Americans] (this particular [African American] being
believed to be guilty) and thus preventing serious anti-[African
American] riots which would probably lead to loss of life, or of

violent offenses.
130. See Bagaric & Gopalan, supra note 6.
131. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31-32 (2003).
132. See Bagaric & Gopalan, supra note 6, at 184.
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allowing the riots to occur. If he were an act utilitarian he would be
committed to framing the [African American]. 133

The main utilitarian goal that inclines in favor of framing the African
American in the above example is community protection, achieved
through community satisfaction regarding the operation of the “justice”
system. In less extreme cases, it is easy to illustrate how proportionality
can be dwarfed to the point of irrelevance by other sentencing
objectives. To this end, there is no need to look beyond the facts in
Ewing. Twenty-five years for stealing golf clubs is, by any measure, a
draconian penalty. This is especially so given that in assessing the
seriousness of an offense, the assessment is confined to the
circumstances of the offense, not previous offenses of the accused. An
offender’s prior criminality does not form part of the calibration of the
offense severity limb of the proportionality thesis. 134
From the perspective of doctrinal rectitude, we have argued that
specific deterrence and general deterrence should not logically increase
penalty lengths because these rationales are empirically flawed. 135 We
have also argued that the objective of community protection should drive
up penalties only slightly. 136 Incapacitating offenders in prison is the
most effective form of community protection given that offenders cannot
commit crime in the community during their period of confinement.
However, incapacitation is only necessary if the offender would have reoffended if he or she was not incarcerated. Incapacitation, in its broadest
sense (as being applicable to all offenders and all offense types), is
flawed because we are poor at predicting which offenders are likely to
commit offenses in the future (especially in relation to serious
offenses), 137 and while incapacitation seems to work in the case of
certain categories of minor offenses, the cost of imprisoning minor
offenders normally outweighs the seriousness of the offense. 138 To the
133. H. J. MCCLOSKEY, META-ETHICS AND NORMATIVE ETHICS 180–81 (1969).
134. Mirko Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime – Not The Prior Convictions of The
Person That Committed The Crime: An Argument For Less Impact Being Accorded to Previous
Convictions In Sentencing, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 343, 345-46, 357 (2014) [hereinafter Bagaric, The
Punishment Should Fit the Crime].
135. See Bagaric & Gopalan, supra note 6.
136. Id.
137. See Jessica Black, Is the Preventive Detention of Dangerous Offenders Justifiable?, 6 J.
APPLIED SECURITY RES. 317, 322-23 (2011). The most thorough treatment of the subject matter is
found in DANGEROUS PEOPLE: POLICY, PREDICTION AND PRACTICE (Bernadette McSherry &
Patrick Keyzer eds., 2011). See also BERNADETTE MCSHERRY & PATRICK KEYZER, SEX
OFFENDERS AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION: POLITICS, POLICY AND PRACTICE (2009).
138. See William Spelman, What Recent Studies Do (and Don’t) Tell Us About Imprisonment
and Crime, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 419-20 (Michael Tonry ed., 2000);
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extent that incapacitation is justifiable, it should be confined to
recidivistic serious sexual and violent offenders, where a recidivist
loading of twenty to fifty percent should be applied, given that is
consistent with their rate of re-offending. 139
It follows that the most common considerations which are used to
justify harsh penalties, in the form of specific deterrence, general
deterrence, and incapacitation, are flawed or are given too much primacy
in the sentencing calculus. Logically and normatively, offenders should
be punished commensurate with the seriousness of their crime, and the
level of punishment should not be increased to satisfy common
sentencing objectives in the form of general deterrence, specific
deterrence, and incapacitation (except to a relatively minor extent
regarding recidivist serious sexual and violent offenders).
However, again, this theoretical framework does not represent
mainstream sentencing practice. The orthodox approach to sentencing
facilitates the enactment and implementation of sentences that can
totally trump the role of proportionality. This reality supports and
justifies Justice Scalia’s approach to proportionality in the context of the
Eighth Amendment.
III. PRISONERS’ RIGHTS AND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
This Part begins by outlining the privations typically associated
with imprisonment. Next, this Part reviews the Supreme Court’s
prisoners’ rights case law. This Part then continues by examining Justice
Scalia’s approach to Eighth Amendment prisoners’ rights claims through
the lens of his critics. After a critical review of Justice Scalia’s approach,
this Part then probes whether the subjective limb of the cruelty test is
valid in light of the substantial punitive effects of incidental punishment.
Next, this Part assays the strength of the objective test in protecting

Roger K. Warren, Evidence-Based Sentencing: The Application of Principles of Evidence-Based
Practice to State Sentencing Practice and Policy, 43 U.S.F.L. REV. 585, 594 (2009); NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 95, at 4-5; Prison and Crime: A
Complex Link, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/
multimedia/data-visualizations/2014/prison-and-crime (last visited Jan. 9, 2017); Don Weatherburn,
Jiuhazo Hua, & Steve Moffatt, How much crime does prison stop? The incapacitation effect of
prison on burglary, NSW BUREAU OF CRIME STAT. & RES. (Jan. 2006),
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/NSWCrimJustB/2006/4.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2017);
Jacqueline Cohen, The Incapacitative Effect of Imprisonment: A Critical Review of the Literature, in
DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON
CRIME RATES 209 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978); see also THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA
(Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2000).
139. Bagaric, The Punishment Should Fit the Crime, supra note 134, at 410.
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prisoners’ rights. This Part concludes by determining that protections
afforded prisoners under the Eighth Amendment are unavoidably
variable, regardless of the validity of the test applied, because of the
vague nature of “rights.”
A. Overview of the Deprivations of Imprisonment
When it comes to the intersection between prisoners’ rights and the
Eighth Amendment, Dolovich correctly notes that “[a]lthough the
Clause prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, its normative force
derives chiefly from its use of the word cruel.” 140 There is no doubt that
prison is a harsh, and ostensibly cruel, environment, and hence, on its
face, the Eighth Amendment has ample scope for operation in the
context of the prison environment. This is especially so given that a
closer look at the conditions that many inmates endure and the longerterm effects of prison indicate that prison is a more traumatic experience
than is apparent from the surface nature of the sanction. The most direct
and obvious negative impact of imprisonment is the deprivation of
liberty. In addition, there are other “pains” of imprisonment, including
the deprivation of access to goods and services; 141 the deprivation of
sexual relationships; 142 the deprivation of security; 143 and the curtailment
of family relationships and the right to procreation.
There are also long-term deprivations stemming from imprisonment
which transcend the period inmates spend behind bars. The negative
consequences of imprisonment include significantly reducing life
expectancy; 144 vulnerabilities associated with financial matters, drug
temptations, decision-making, and social interactions; 145 negative
140.
141.

Dolovich, supra note 11, at 883.
GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A MAXIMUM SECURITY
PRISON 67-68 (2007).
142. Id. at 70-71; see also Robert Johnson & Hans Toch, Introduction to THE PAINS OF
IMPRISONMENT 17 (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch eds., 1982).
143. SYKES, supra note 141, at 76-77.
144. A study which examined the 15.5 year survival rate of 23,510 ex-prisoners in the U.S.
State of Georgia, found much higher mortality rates for ex-prisoners than for the rest of the
population. There were 2,650 deaths in total, which was a forty-three percent higher mortality rate
than normally expected (799 more ex-prisoners died than expected). The main causes for the
increased mortality rates were: homicide, transportation accidents, accidental poisoning (which
included drug overdoses), and suicide. Anne C. Spaulding et al., Prisoner Survival Inside and
Outside of the Institution: Implications for Health-Care Planning, 173 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 479,
479, 481-82 (2011); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra
note 95, at 220-26.
145. Michael Roguski & Fleur Chauvel, The Effects of Imprisonment on Inmates’ and their
Families’ Health and Wellbeing, NAT’L HEALTH COMM. 61 (Nov. 2009),
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impacts on family members of prisoners, including higher rates of
divorce; 146 homelessness; 147 higher rates of depression, anxiety, and
antisocial behavior among children of inmates; 148 and difficulty in
securing employment and lower rates of lifetime earnings. 149
We have suggested that these deprivations are so profound that they
raise important human rights concerns. 150 The fact that rights
infringements relating to cardinal human interests such as the right to
security, employment, family, and procreation are denied or limited in
the prison setting does not excuse or justify this state of affairs. Rather, it
makes it worse because it cumulates the pain stemming from the
deprivation of liberty.
While prisoners are subject to a number of potential human rights
denials, these violations have, by and large, not been ameliorated by the
Supreme Court in its application of the Eighth Amendment. As noted by
Sharon Dolovich:
To the extent that the Supreme Court has considered what makes a
punishment cruel, it has done so primarily in assessing criminal
sanctions. In some cases, the Court has found the use of certain
penalties to be per se unconstitutional, something the state may never
do to anyone as punishment. But for the most part, when courts
consider challenges to criminal sentences, whether the death penalty or
a prison sentence or some other penalty, the linchpin of the analysis is
the criminal offense. 151

In particular, Justice Scalia did not adopt a position consistent with
enhancing prisoners’ rights. We now examine in greater detail the
limited role that the Eighth Amendment has had in protecting the rights
of prisoners and the basis for this approach.
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Prisoners’ Rights
As we shall see, the Eighth Amendment is not a provision that is

http://www.antoniocasella.eu/salute/Roguski_2009.pdf (last visited Jan. 9, 2016). A limitation of
this research is that it had a small sample size—consisting only of 63 participants. Id. at 3.
146. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION, supra note 95, at 265.
147. Id. at 267.
148. Id. at 270.
149. Id. at 247. One study estimated the earnings reduction to be as high as forty percent.
Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, DÆDALUS, Summer 2010, at 13.
150. Mirko Bagaric, Sandeep Gopalan & Marissa Florio, A Principled Strategy for Addressing
the Incarceration Crisis: Redefining Excessive Imprisonment as a Human Rights Abuse, 38(5)
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2017).
151. Dolovich, supra note 11, at 884.
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conventionally invoked in relation to the administration of sentences. 152
In fact, only in rare instances has the Supreme Court interpreted the
Eighth Amendment in a manner which protects prisoners’ rights. 153
The criteria for upholding a prisoner’s right to his physical integrity
was set out in Farmer v. Brennan, 154 where the Court held that in order
for prison conditions to violate the Eighth Amendment, two elements
must be satisfied. 155 First, it must be established that, in an objective
sense, the inmate either was harmed as a result of being deprived of a
basic human need or has experienced or was exposed to serious harm. 156
After satisfying this first requirement, it must then be established that the
relevant prison official was subjectively aware of the violation and did
not respond in a reasonable manner. 157 The Court emphasized that “[t]he
Eighth Amendment does not outlaw cruel and unusual ‘conditions’; it
outlaws cruel and unusual ‘punishments,’” and for this to occur, there
must be a subjective intention to inflict punishment. 158 There can be no
Eighth Amendment violation “unless the official knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” 159
In Wilson v. Seiter, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated
that the subjective requirement is necessary in relation to both “‘shortterm’ or ‘one-time conditions’” and “‘continuing’ or ‘systemic’
conditions . . . .” 160 Justice Scalia stated:
[There is] neither a logical nor a practical basis for [the short term/long
term] distinction. The source of the intent requirement is not the
152. Id. at 884-85.
153. For a historical overview of this area of law, see Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison
Sentences, supra note 39, at 39, 59-61.
154. 511 U.S. 825 (1994). This is regarded by some as the most important decision regarding
the application of the Eighth Amendment to prison conditions and prisoners rights. See Dolovich,
supra note 11, at 889-90.
155. For a discussion of the elements, see Ryan, supra note 8. As noted by Richard Frase,
neither of these standards “strongly emphasize[] proportionality.” Frase, supra note 39, at 60.
156. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
157. Id. at 847. To this end, as noted by Meghan Ryan, there are slightly different subjective
tests applied in relation to medical care cases and excessive force cases: “[I]n the first category—the
medical care cases—the Court has determined that prison authorities’ ‘deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs of prisoners’ constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. In the second category—the excessive force cases—the Court has found it
unconstitutional for prison authorities to ‘maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm’ to
prisoners. . . . In both the medical-care cases and the excessive-force cases, the Court is concerned
about the prison officials’ purposes behind their actions: Were they deliberately indifferent toward
the inmate’s basic needs? Or were they maliciously and sadistically employing force against the
inmate?” Ryan, supra note 8, at 2164 (emphasis added).
158. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-39.
159. Id. at 837.
160. 501 U.S. 294, 296-302 (1991).
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predilections of this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself, which
bans only cruel and unusual punishment. If the pain inflicted is not
formally meted out as punishment by the statute or the sentencing
judge, some mental element must be attributed to the inflicting officer
before it can qualify. 161

He added that:
The thread common to all [Eighth Amendment prison cases] is that
“punishment” has been deliberately administered for a penal or
disciplinary purpose. . . . The long duration of a cruel prison condition
may make it easier to establish knowledge, and hence some form of
intent, . . . but there is no logical reason why it should cause the
requirement of intent to evaporate. The proposed short-term/long-term
distinction also defies rational implementation. Apart from the
difficulty of determining the day or hour that divides the two
categories (is it the same for all conditions?), the violations alleged in
specific cases often consist of composite conditions that do not lend
themselves to such pigeonholing. 162

Hence, in rejecting the short term/long term distinction, Justice Scalia
relied on the express terms of the Eighth Amendment and also practical
difficulties associated with applying such a distinction.
In Hudson v. McMillian, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth
Amendment was violated when a prison official beat an inmate. 163
Excessive force against an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment when
it is used “maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm.” 164 Justice Scalia dissented in this case (along with Justice
Thomas) on the basis that the Eighth Amendment can only be invoked
where the prisoner suffers serious harm: “[i]n my view, a use of force
that causes only insignificant harm to a prisoner may be immoral, it may
be tortious, it may be criminal, and it may even be remediable under

161. Id. at 300.
162. Id. at 300-01.The groundwork for this distinction was laid in Wilson. See Dolovich, supra
note 11, at 896-98. In Hope v. Pelzer, the Supreme Court held that the use of a “hitching post” by
prison guards to handcuff a prisoner for seven hours in the hot sun constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. 536 U.S. 730, 745-48 (2002) It was also held that the prison officials could not rely on
the defense of qualified immunity against the prisoner’s civil claim because their actions violated
“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Id. at 739-41. Justice Scalia, again finding himself among the dissenters, agreed with
Justice Thomas that the acts of prison officials in handcuffing a prisoner to a restraining bar was not
a violation of a clearly established right. Id. at 752.
163. 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
164. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986) (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028,
1033 (1973) (Friendly, J.)).
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other provisions of the Federal Constitution, but it is not ‘cruel and
unusual punishment.’” 165
Justice Scalia added:
We made clear in Estelle that the Eighth Amendment plays a very
limited role in regulating prison administration. . . . [T]he Eighth
Amendment does not apply to every deprivation, or even every
unnecessary deprivation, suffered by a prisoner, but only that narrow
class of deprivations involving “serious” injury inflicted by prison
officials acting with a culpable state of mind. We have since described
these twin elements as the “objective” and “subjective” components of
an Eighth Amendment prison claim. (citation omitted). 166

He continued:
We have never found a violation of the Eighth Amendment in the
prison context when an inmate has failed to establish either of these
elements. 167

He further remarked:
We synthesized our Eighth Amendment prison jurisprudence last Term
in Wilson . . . . There the inmate alleged that the poor conditions of his
confinement per se amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, and
argued that he should not be required in addition to establish that
officials acted culpably. We rejected that argument, emphasizing that
an inmate seeking to establish that a prison deprivation amounts to
cruel and unusual punishment always must satisfy both the “objective
component . . . (was the deprivation sufficiently serious?)” and the
“subjective component (did the officials act with a sufficiently
culpable state of mind?)” of the Eighth Amendment. (citation omitted).
Both are necessary components; neither suffices by itself. 168

In relevant part, he concluded (quoting Wilson v. Seiter):
If the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment by the
statute or the sentencing judge, some mental element must be
attributed to the inflicting officer before it can qualify [as
punishment]. 169

Accordingly, Justice Scalia was firmly of the view that the Eighth
Amendment, so far as prisoner’s rights are concerned, only applies in
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
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relation to the deliberate infliction of serious harm.
The high-water mark for upholding prisoner’s rights pursuant to the
Eighth Amendment is the decision in Brown v. Plata, where the
Supreme Court, by a 5-4 majority, affirmed a decision by a district court
requiring California to reduce its prison capacity to 137.5 percent of the
prisons’ rated capacity by the end of 2013. 170 As a result of the
overcrowding, prisoners in California were denied access to basic health
services and treatment, in relation to both physical and psychological
problems. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated:
To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to provide for
their own needs. Prisoners are dependent on the State for food,
clothing, and necessary medical care. A prison’s failure to provide
sustenance for inmates “may actually produce physical ‘torture or a
lingering death.’” (citations omitted). Just as a prisoner may starve if
not fed, he or she may suffer or die if not provided adequate medical
care. A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including
adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human
dignity and has no place in civilized society. If government fails to
fulfill this obligation, the courts have a responsibility to remedy the
resulting Eighth Amendment violation. (citation omitted). Courts must
be sensitive to the State’s interest in punishment, deterrence, and
rehabilitation, as well as the need for deference to experienced and
expert prison administrators faced with the difficult and dangerous task
of housing large numbers of convicted criminals. (citation omitted).
Courts nevertheless must not shrink from their obligation to “enforce
the constitutional rights of all ‘persons,’ including prisoners.” (citation
omitted). Courts may not allow constitutional violations to continue
simply because a remedy would involve intrusion into the realm of
prison administration. 171

The majority held that consistent with the terms of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), the court could limit the prison population
to a percentage of design capacity of the prisons, given that this was the
only way to ameliorate the breach of the Eighth Amendment. 172 The
majority emphasized that curing the overcrowding was essential in order
to remedy the rights infringements that were occasioned upon sick and
mentally ill prisoners. 173
170.
v. Brown
(2013).
171.
172.
173.

563 U.S. 493, 545 (2011). For a discussion of this decision, see Margo Schlanger, Plata
and Realignment: Jails, Prisons, Courts, and Politics, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 165
Plata, 563 U.S. at 510-11.
Id. at 524-26.
Id. at 530.
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The majority added:
The medical and mental health care provided by California’s prisons
falls below the standard of decency that inheres in the Eighth
Amendment. This extensive and ongoing constitutional violation
requires a remedy, and a remedy will not be achieved without a
reduction in overcrowding. The relief ordered by the three-judge court
is required by the Constitution and was authorized by Congress in the
PLRA. The State shall implement the order without further delay. 174

A somewhat perplexing aspect of the majority decision is that it would
be based in part on such an inherently vague concept as “decency.”
In Brown v. Plata, Justice Scalia dissented for several reasons. He
noted that the mistreatment alleged in the case was not related to each
individual prisoner, but rather a systemic failing that resulted in a
relatively small portion of prisoners having their right to basic health
care denied:
The plaintiffs do not appear to claim—and it would absurd to
suggest—that every single one of those prisoners has personally
experienced “torture or a lingering death,” . . . as a consequence of that
bad medical system. Indeed, it is inconceivable that anything more
than a small proportion of prisoners in the plaintiff classes have
personally received sufficiently atrocious treatment that their Eighth
Amendment right was violated—which, as the Court recognizes, is
why the plaintiffs do not premise their claim on “deficiencies in care
provided on any one occasion.” (citation omitted). Rather, the
plaintiffs’ claim is that they are all part of a medical system so
defective that some number of prisoners will inevitably be injured by
incompetent medical care, and that this number is sufficiently high so
as to render the system, as a whole, unconstitutional. 175

Justice Scalia took the view that there was no tenable procedural
principle that could justify certifying a class of plaintiffs in a manner
whereby they could make a claim of systemic unconstitutionality. 176 He
stated:
Whether procedurally wrong or substantively wrong, the notion that
the plaintiff class can allege an Eighth Amendment violation based on
“system wide deficiencies” is assuredly wrong. It follows that the

174. Id. at 545.
175. Id. at 551-52.
176. It has been correctly noted that the decision in Plata was not as radical as indicated by
Justice Scalia. Court orders to reduce prison populations are not unprecedented and in fact were
once even “commonplace.” Schlanger, supra note 170, at 196.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

37

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 5

338

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:301

remedy decreed here is also contrary to law, since the theory of
systemic unconstitutionality is central to the plaintiffs’ case. 177

Justice Scalia described the decision as “perhaps the most radical
injunction issued by a court in our Nation’s history,” 178 and the outcome
of the case so undesirable to require “every effort to read the law in such
a way as to avoid that outrageous result.” 179 He added that, in ruling in
favor of the prison reduction order:
[T]he Court has aggrandized itself, grasping authority that appellate
courts are not supposed to have, and using it to enact a compromise
solution with no legal basis other than the Court’s say-so. That we are
driven to engage in these extralegal activities should be a sign that the
entire project of permitting district courts to run prison systems is
misbegotten. 180

Thus, Justice Scalia felt so strongly that the majority position was flawed
that he expressly criticized the court for exceeding the proper limits of
its authority.
C. Criticism of Scalia’s Approach to Eighth Amendment Prisoner’s
Rights Claims
Scholars have been highly critical of Justice Scalia’s approach to
prisoners’ rights claims under the Eighth Amendment. Christopher E.
Smith has claimed that Justice Scalia, in Wilson v. Seiter, was
responsible for reframing the test for breach of the Eighth Amendment
by injecting the subjective element from precedents that were not
applicable. 181 Smith states that Justice Scalia:
[A]ltered the test used to examine whether conditions of confinement
in prisons violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishments. . . . In Wilson, Justice Scalia avoided discussing
[earlier] precedents on prison conditions and instead treated as
controlling precedent two cases that were about very specific Eighth
Amendment issues—medical care and the use of force, neither of
177. Plata, 563 U.S. at 553.
178. Id. at 550.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 562.
181. Wilson v. Seiter is one of two cases in relation to which it has been suggested that “Justice
Scalia exerted significant influence over the definition and existence of prisoners’ rights through
two majority opinions in which he ingeniously exploited the malleability of judicial language in
order to create new precedent that curtailed rights for prisoners.” Smith, supra note 3, at 870. The
other case was Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), although the case did not concern an Eighth
Amendment issue.
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which were the focus of the claims in Wilson. He selectively chose to
use these other precedents in order to announce a new rule requiring a
subjective evaluation of prison conditions. Justice Scalia’s opinion
required prisoners to prove “deliberate indifference” on the part of
corrections officials in order to show that prison conditions violated
the Eighth Amendment. 182

Smith’s charge about the selective use of precedents is not forceful. The
analogies drawn by Justice Scalia were tenable, and there is no evidence
for asserting that they constitute a manifest manipulation of precedent in
order to achieve a desired outcome. This is supported by the fact that the
majority of the members of the Court in Wilson v. Seiter joined the
opinion of Justice Scalia.
Dolovich has been particularly critical of the subjective limb that
prisoners must satisfy in order to invoke the Eighth Amendment.
According to her, due to the very nature of prison (which nearly totally
disempowers prisoners), the state has a “carceral burden” which makes
the state responsible for conditions which offenders experience in
prison. 183 She states:
[A]ll the conditions to which an offender is subjected at the hands of
state officials over the course of his incarceration are appropriately
open to Eighth Amendment scrutiny. Understood in this light, the
requirement that the punishment be “deliberately” imposed in order “to
chastise or deter” does not disappear. Its satisfaction may simply be
taken for granted whenever a convicted criminal offender is sentenced
to prison. 184

In our view, the general approach by Dolovich regarding the criteria that
should be satisfied in order for the Eighth Amendment to operate in the
context of prisoners’ rights is sound. However, that outcome (and an
explanation of the flaw with Justice Scalia’s reasoning in this area) can
be achieved by a more linear approach. Even if it is supposed that certain
forms of hardship that occur in the prison setting are not intended by the
state, it can yet be established that these hardships still constitute
“punishment” in the proper sense of the word. The advantage of reexamining whether in fact most hardships sustained by inmates
constitute “punishment” is that this approach does not rely on
contentious doctrines (such as the carceral burden) and adopts the same
nomenclature as Justice Scalia and other members of the Supreme Court.
182.
183.
184.
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D. The Subjective Limb of the Cruelty Test is Flawed: Incidental
Punishment can Still be Punishment
An examination of the criteria that should be satisfied in order for a
hardship or deprivation to potentially come within the purview of the
Eighth Amendment is complicated by the fact that there is no universally
accepted definition of punishment and by the fact that little scholarly
attention has been paid to the issue of how extra-curial punishment (such
as harsh prison conditions) should be classified. 185
In defining punishment, some commentators focus on its
association with guilt. Thus, Herbert Morris defines punishment as “the
imposition upon a person who is believed to be at fault of something
commonly believed to be a deprivation where that deprivation is
justified by the person’s guilty behavior.” 186 Duff defines punishment as
“the infliction of suffering on a member of the community who has
broken its laws,” 187 and, similarly, McTaggart defines punishment as
“the infliction of pain on a person because he has done wrong.” 188 A
wider definition is provided by Nigel Walker, who observes that while
punishment generally requires that the offender has voluntarily
committed the relevant act, it is sufficient that the punisher believes or
pretends to believe that he or she has done so. 189 This definition better
reflects this aspect of punishment, given that there is no question that the
accused that are wrongly convicted and sentenced by courts undergo
punishment. However, what is notable for the purpose of this discussion
is that the above definitions, while focusing on the aspect of guilt,
nevertheless require that the punishment is for the crime; that is, there is
the implicit requirement of a causal link between the two subject
matters.
This link also emerges in relation to commentators who focus on
the connection with blame as being cardinal to the concept of
punishment. Andrew von Hirsch states that “[p]unishing someone
185. Formally, an extra-curial punishment is a hardship stemming from the commission of the
offense that is imposed on an offender by other than the sentencing court. Other examples include
loss of employment, public opprobrium, and injuries sustained during the commission of the crime.
See Mirko Bagaric, Lidia Xynas & Victoria Lambropoulos, The Irrelevance to Sentencing of (Most)
Incidental Hardships Suffered by Offenders, 39 UNIV. OF NEW SOUTH WALES L. J. 47 (2016).
186. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 76, 83 (Indiana
Univ. Press, 1971).
187. DUFF, supra note 78, at 267. Duff also states that punishment is suffering imposed on an
offender for an offense by a duly constituted authority. Id. at 151.
188. JOHN MCTAGGART & ELLIS MCTAGGART, STUDIES IN HEGELIAN COSMOLOGY 129
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 1901).
189. NIGEL WALKER, WHY PUNISH? 2 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1991).
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consists of visiting a deprivation (hard treatment) on him, because he
supposedly has committed a wrong, in a manner that expresses
disapprobation on the person for his conduct”, 190 or that “[p]unishing
someone consists of doing something painful or unpleasant to him,
because he has purportedly committed a wrong, under circumstances and
in a manner that conveys disapprobation of the offender for his
wrong.” 191
Apart from the alleged requirement of guilt and the tendency of
punishment to condemn, another common definitional trait is the
assumption that punishment must be imposed by a person in authority.
For example, Hobbes provides that punishment is an:
Evill inflicted by publique Authority, on him that hath done, or omitted
that which is Judged by the same Authority to be a Transgression of
the law; to the end that the will of men may thereby the better be
disposed to obedience. . . . [T]he aym of Punishment is not a revenge,
but terrour . . . . 192

In a similar vein, Honderich defines punishment as “an authority’s
infliction of a penalty, something involving deprivation or distress, on an
offender, someone found to have broken a rule, for an offence, an act of
the kind prohibited by the rule.” 193 In the postscript to the same book,
written over a decade later, punishment is defined as “that practice
whereby a social authority visits penalties on offenders, one of its
deliberate aims being to do so.” 194 If the imposition of the punishment
by an authority is essential, it follows that most forms of extra-curial
punishment are not relevant to sentencing.
Some scholars have defined punishment in terms of pain. Bentham
simply declared that “all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself
is evil.” 195 Ten states that punishment “involves the infliction of some
unpleasantness on the offender, or it deprives the offender of something
valued.” 196 Others have placed somewhat emotive emphasis on the hurt
that punishment seeks to bring about. Punishment has been described as
pain delivery, 197 and similarly, it has been asserted that “[t]he intrinsic

190. Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Proportionality, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT 115,
118 (R.A. Duff & David Garland eds., 1994) (emphasis added).
191. VON HIRSCH, supra note 94, at 35.
192. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 353, 355 (Penguin, 1968 ed.) (emphasis added).
193. HONDERICH, supra note 74, at 15.
194. Id. at 208 (emphasis added).
195. BENTHAM, supra note 93, at 158.
196. TEN, supra note 81, at 2.
197. NILS CHRISTIE, LIMITS TO PAIN 19, 48 (Martin Robertson ed., 1981).
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point of punishment is that it should hurt – that it should inflict
suffering, hardship or burdens . . . .” 198
Thus, there are numerous definitions of punishment. Most of them
involve concepts that negate (or at least incline against) the possibility of
extra-curial hardships coming within the scope of the concept. Extracurial hardship, while it constitutes a deprivation, is not imposed by an
authority and does not require blame to be projected at the offender.
Furthermore, in most instances, there is no need for the offender to be
found guilty of an offense.
However, these observations are not necessarily decisive against
such deprivations being instances of punishment: the accounts of
punishment that leave little scope for the operation of extra-curial
hardships might be flawed. Additionally, there is a logical distinction
between the definition of a term at its literal and justificatory levels. We
now explore this dichotomy in greater detail.
From the above accounts of punishment, it emerges that there is
consensus on two points—that punishment involves some type of
unpleasantness and that punishment is meted out on account of actual or
perceived wrongdoing.
The requirement that punishment must be imposed by a person in
authority is less obvious. Walker takes the view that punishment can be
ordered by anyone who is regarded as having the right to do so, such as
certain members of a society or family, 199 not merely a formal legal
authority, and that punishment stems not only from violation of legal
rules, but extends to infringements of social rules or customs. 200 This
would seem to accord with general notions regarding punishment, and
indeed, there would appear to be many parallels between, for example,
family discipline and legal punishment. 201 As Walker points out,
punishment need not be by the state, and it has different names
depending on the forum in which it is imposed. He adds that: “[w]hen
imposed by English-speaking courts it is called ‘sentencing’. In the
Christian Church it is ‘penance’. In schools, colleges, professional
organizations, clubs, trade unions, and armed forces its name is
‘disciplining’ or ‘penalizing.’” 202
Thus, in principle, there does not appear to be any reason that the
198.

ANTHONY DUFF, Punishment, Citizenship and Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT, EXCUSES
18 (Henry Tam ed., 1996).
WALKER, supra note 189, at 2.
Id.
See, e.g., Morris, supra note 186.
WALKER, supra note 189, at 1; see also KLEINIG, supra note 80, at 17–22.

AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

199.
200.
201.
202.
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practice of punishment should not extend to other situations (i.e., those
beyond the court setting) where the punisher is in a position of
dominance, such as where the punisher is a teacher, parent, or employer.
Guilt and blame are also not intrinsic features of punishment.
Innocent people who are wrongly convicted and imprisoned are
nevertheless punished. Blame is a broader concept than guilt, but
probably still not essential for punishment to occur. While nearly all
criminal behavior engenders a degree of blame, there are some types of
behavior where it is arguably lacking. An example is “mercy killing”
(i.e., active voluntary euthanasia), which, strictly speaking, is murder but
may not attract condemnation. 203 A more modest and accurate ingredient
of this requirement in the context of punishment is that punishment is
imposed to right a wrong. 204
Thus, at its core, punishment consists of: (i) a hardship or
deprivation and (ii) the taking away of something of value 205 for a wrong
actually or apparently committed.206 Typically, this would be
administered by another person, although it is not clear whether that is
essential.
The first requirement is incontestable: an experience which benefits
an individual or has no impact on them is not punishment. The second
requirement is less germane but nevertheless essential. Without this
stipulation, any experience that constituted a detriment could be termed
a punishment. However, it is not credible to describe an illness, failure in
an exam, or a marriage break-up as a form of punishment.

203. Opinion polls show that approximately eighty percent of the community are in favor of
active voluntary euthanasia. A poll published in The Australian on February 15, 1995, showed that
eighty-one percent of people favored euthanasia. See Justine Ferrari, Eight in 10 Support Law to
Allow Euthanasia, AUSTL., Feb. 15, 1995, at 3. This figure is in line with international trends. Polls
in the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada show approval rates for euthanasia of
seventy-eight percent, sixty-eight percent, and seventy-eight percent, respectively. Select
Committee on Euthanasia, Report of the Inquiry by the Select Committee on Euthanasia, LEGIS.
ASSEMBLY N. TERRITORY 59-60 (May 1995), http://www.nt.gov.au/lant/parliamentarybusiness/committees/rotti/rottireport/vol1.pdf. The results of a comprehensive range of surveys on
euthanasia are detailed in Senate Legal & Constitutional Legislation Committee, Consideration of
Legislation Referred to the Committee: Euthanasia Laws Bill 1996, PARLIAMENT COMMONWEALTH
AUS. ch. 7 (Mar. 1997), http://www.aph.gov.au/binaries/senate/committee/legcon_ctte/
completed_inquiries/1996-99/euthanasia/report/report.pdf. For a more general view, see MARGARET
OTLOWSKI, VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA AND THE COMMON LAW (1997).
204. “Wrong” is defined broadly here to mean a violation of a moral, civil, or criminal norm.
205. In this respect, we agree with Kleinig who points out that punishment involves some
deliberate imposition by the punisher on the punished. KLEINIG, supra note 80, at 22-23.
206. Apart from the qualification relating to the perception of the offense, this definition
accords with that advanced by C. L. Ten, Crime and punishment, in A COMPANION TO ETHICS 366
(Peter Singer ed., 1991).
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Thus, in order for a hardship to constitute a form of punishment, it
must be a form of deprivation, and there must be some connection
between the deprivation and the violation of a social norm (or law).
Issues of causation are inherently complex and no satisfactory theory of
legal causation has been developed by the courts or legislatures which
can be invoked to provide clear answers to complex interactions.207
However, several bright lines have been drawn in this context that apply
to resolve clear-cut instances. They operate to exclude several forms of
extra-curial punishment from being factored into the sentencing realm.
For example, injuries sustained during the offense due to offender
inadvertence or misadventure are not sufficiently connected to the
offending behavior to be categorized as punishment. Rather, the fact that
an offense is being committed in such circumstances is merely part of
the backdrop to the injury. The injury is neither precipitated by a finding
of guilt nor an attribution of blame, at least not in the sense of a
considered judgment being made to this end.
Where an offender is injured in a drug laboratory explosion or in a
motor vehicle collision that results in the death of other people, the
injury is not caused by the fact that the conduct is a criminal offense.
The legal characterization of the behavior is simply part of the
contextual backdrop to the behavior which can only be determined
definitively in an ex-post facto sense. Moreover, there is clearly no
institutional or systemic decision-making process that mandates
criminality as being a necessary ingredient or requirement for the
infliction of the injury. In such cases, the injury is simply an unfortunate
happenstance arising from an (admittedly illegal) activity that the
offender was undertaking at the time. The hardship (in the form of the
injury) is not one that is, in any sense of the word, imposed for the
crime. The connection between the crime and the injury is so tenuous
that not even the most modest causation requirement is satisfied. The
minimal test for causation that has been advanced is the “but for”
standard. If an accused person who is suspected of dangerous driving is
injured during a collision that kills others and is subsequently acquitted
of the offense, the injury will obviously remain even though any
(institutional) sense of wrongdoing has been negated. It follows that the
legality of the conduct is merely part of the setting in which the injury
occurred—but it is a setting that has no legal relevance.

207. The authoritative (and seminal) work on causation remains H.L.A. HART & A.M.
HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959). See also THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CAUSATION
(Helen Beebee et al. eds., 2009).
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Different considerations apply, however, relating to hardship
incurred in an institutional setting. In this regard, the prisoner is
institutionalized solely because of the crime. Hence, there is a strong
argument that punishment consists of all deprivations experienced by the
prisoners which foreseeably stem from the incarceration. This extends to
compromised health care and beatings by staff, but not, for example, to
an injury sustained due to an earthquake that damaged the prison.
Accordingly, deprivations experienced by inmates which are a
foreseeable incident of their confinement do fall within the meaning of
punishment. All such hardships should be factored into an assessment of
whether treatment is cruel and thus a violation of the Eighth
Amendment. The contrary position adopted by Justice Scalia and the
majority of the Court is flawed. Therefore, the subjective limb of the test
for whether treatment of prisoners is cruel should be abolished.
E. The Subjective Requirement is not the Primary Cause of the Weak
Protection of Prisoners’ Rights by the Eighth Amendment—the
Objective Test is too Strict
The subjective requirement for Eighth Amendment breaches is
flawed. 208 However, despite the criticism that this requirement has
received, it is not clear that this is the main cause of the very limited
protection conferred by Eighth Amendment for prisoners’ rights.
Arguably, it is the interpretation that has been applied to the objective
limb which has most significantly limited the application of the Eighth
Amendment in prisoners’ rights cases. This is best illustrated in the
context of challenges to the harshest of prison conditions—those found
in super-maximum prisons.
Over the past two decades, there has been a considerable increase
worldwide in the utilization of “super-maximum [security]” or
“supermax” prisons. 209 One of the first super-maximum prisons was the
“rock fortress” Alcatraz in San Francisco Bay, which was operated by
the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons from 1934 until its closure in
1963. 210 The number of such facilities has grown rapidly since that time.
More than forty U.S. states now have super-maximum prisons. 211 These
208.
209.

See Frase, Limiting Excessive Prison Sentences, supra note 39, at 61.
For a discussion of the operations in each of these countries, see THE GLOBALIZATION OF
SUPERMAX PRISONS (Jeffrey Ian Ross ed., 2013).
210. Roy D. King, The Rise and Rise of Supermax: An American Solution in Search of a
Problem?, 1 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 163, 166 (1999).
211. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ENTOMBED: ISOLATION IN THE FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM 2
(July 2014).
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prisons or units within prisons house at least 25,000 prisoners. 212
Unlike regular prison, there is no consistency regarding the exact
daily regimes of super-max prisoners, but such regimens can include
being locked in cells for up to twenty-three hours per day. 213 When
prisoners are out of their cells, they move to what is, in effect, no more
than another (larger) cell where they normally have contact with no
more than one other prisoner. 214 These facilities normally consist of
“jails within prisons.” 215 There is no uniformity to such conditions but,
in general, they involve “incarcerating inmates under highly isolated
conditions with severely limited access to programs, exercise, staff, or
other inmates.” 216 Keramet Reiter describes the conditions as follows:
“Supermax” prisoners in the United States live for months (and often
years) at a time in windowless, poured-concrete boxes. Each “box,” or
cell, includes roughly eighty square feet of space—about the size of a
handicap bathroom stall, or a parking space. Prisoners spend at least
twenty-two hours of every day in these cells, under fluorescent lights
that never turn off. They only leave their cells four or five times per
week, for showers or for brief, solitary exercise periods in “dog
runs”—concrete pens with roofs at least partially open to natural
light. . . . Usually, prisoners live in total solitary confinement in these
cells. 217

Super-maximum prisons are not only considerably more physically
onerous than normal prisons, but there is also significant evidence
establishing that they cause psychological damage to inmates.
A relatively recent report by Amnesty International notes:
There is a significant body of evidence that confining individuals in
isolated conditions, even for relatively short periods of time, can cause

212. Id. See Keramet Reiter, Supermax Administration and the Eighth Amendment: Deference,
Discretion, and Double Bunking, 1986–2010, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 89, 91 (2015).
213. Leena Kurki & Norval Morris, The Purposes, Practices, and Problems of Supermax
Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 385, 407 (2001).
214. Liz Hobday, High-security prison ‘driving remand prisoners mad’, ABC ONLINE (Sept.
22, 2009), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2009-09-22/high-security-prison-driving-remand-prisonersmad/1437474 (last visited Jan. 11, 2017).
215. CHASE RIVELAND, SUPERMAX PRISONS: OVERVIEW AND GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 1
(1999).
216. Id. They have also been defined as “a free-standing facility, or a distinct unit within a
facility, that provides for the management and secure control of inmates who have been officially
designated as exhibiting violent or seriously disruptive behaviour while incarcerated. . . . [T]heir
behavior can only be controlled by separation, restricted movement, and limited direct access to
staff and other inmates.” King, supra note 210, at 170.
217. Reiter, supra note 212, at 90-91.
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serious psychological and sometimes physiological harm, with
symptoms including anxiety and depression, insomnia, hypertension,
extreme paranoia, perceptual distortions and psychosis. This damaging
effect can be immediate and increases the longer the measure lasts and
the more indeterminate it is. Isolation has been found to have negative
effects on individuals with no pre-existing illness and to be particularly
harmful in the case of those who already suffer from mental illness. 218

Despite the widely-acknowledged dangers of physical and psychological
damage associated with imprisonment in super-max prisons, opponents
of these conditions have faced stark challenges in U.S. courts.
The legality of super-max conditions has been challenged on
numerous occasions, always without success. 219 The key decision on the
legality of super-max conditions is Madrid v. Gomez, 220 where the court
applied the test articulated in Farmer v. Brennan. In upholding the
validity of the prison conditions as to most prisoners in the Secure
Housing Unit (SHU) at the Pelican Bay State Prison in California, the
court did not even address the subjective limb of the test because it held
that the conditions did not constitute a serious harm to prisoners. 221 The
court stated:
Here, the record demonstrates that the conditions of extreme social
isolation and reduced environmental stimulation found in the Pelican
Bay SHU will likely inflict some degree of psychological trauma upon
most inmates confined there for more than brief periods. Clearly, this
impact is not to be trivialized; however, for many inmates, it does not
appear that the degree of mental injury suffered significantly exceeds
the kind of generalized psychological pain that courts have found
compatible with Eighth Amendment standards. While a risk of a more
serious injury is not non-existent, we are not persuaded, on the present
record and given all the circumstances, that the risk of developing an
injury to mental health of sufficiently serious magnitude due to current
conditions in the SHU is high enough for the SHU population as a
whole, to find that current conditions in the SHU are per se violative of
the Eighth Amendment with respect to all potential inmates. 222

The court noted that a relevant consideration in determining whether

218. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 211, at 31; see also Jesenia Pizarro & Vanja M.
K. Stenius, Supermax Prisons: Their Rise, Current Practices, and Effect on Inmates, 84 PRISON J.
248, 256 (2004).
219. See Reiter, supra note 212.
220. 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
221. Id. at 1279-80.
222. Id. at 1265.
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prison conditions violate the Eighth Amendment is whether such
conditions have a valid penological objective. 223 The main penological
purpose in this case was the need to “maintain the safety and security of
both staff and inmates” and, in some cases, to punish offenders.224
Although some forms of treatment are so harmful and damaging that
they can never be justified, the court held that the Constitution allows
more severe forms of treatment where they have a demonstrated
penological purpose: “a condition or other prison measure that has little
or no penological value may offend constitutional values upon a lower
showing of injury or harm.” 225
However, the Court did note that in relation to certain categories of
prisoners and types of treatment in the case, the Eighth Amendment had
been violated. This was so in relation to prisoners who were mentally ill
and those who were at very high risk of experiencing very serious harm
to their mental health. In relation to this conduct, it was found that the
subjective test was also satisfied.
The only occasion where the Supreme Court considered the validity
of super-max conditions was in 2005 in Wilkinson v. Austin. 226 However,
the issue in that case was whether the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment conferred a liberty interest to prisoners in not
being subjected to super-max conditions. 227 The Eighth Amendment
issue was not litigated because, as noted by Reiter, the issue had been
effectively resolved by a number of lower court decisions which
consistently held that super-max conditions do not violate the Eighth
Amendment. Reiter states:
The Wilkinson Court . . . did not evaluate whether OSP conditions
violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. . . . [B]y the time the Court heard arguments in Wilkinson,
numerous lower federal courts, including the Madrid court, had
already decided that supermax conditions did not violate the Eighth
Amendment. 228

Since Wilkinson, the Court has evinced little interest in taking the issue
again for reconsideration.

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1159.
Id. at 1263.
545 U.S. 209 (2005).
Id. at 221-24.
Reiter, supra note 212, at 112.
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F. The Eighth Amendment Protection for Prisoners is Unavoidably
Fickle Due to the Vague Nature of “Rights”
The fact that super-max conditions were not invalidated under the
Eighth Amendment stems not only from the high bar that the court set
for establishing the objective requirement, but also from the intrinsically
obscure and abstract nature of rights. 229 As noted above, prisoners’ rights
to be free from physical and psychological distress have often been
defeated by the perceived security concerns of prison staff and other
prisoners. No right is absolute and, at some point, all rights can be
defeated by contrary interests in the form of conflicting rights or the
greater good. 230 There is no firm formula for ascertaining the
circumstances in which a right can be curtailed by other competing
interests. Given this, in the case of super-max conditions, the interests of
prisoners can readily be trumped by safety considerations without any
hint of incoherency. The weighing and prioritization process is fluid and
amenable to impressionistic judgment that is beyond the bounds of
forceful contradiction. This is symptomatic of the limits of interests in
the nature of rights to coherently and effectively protect human
interests. 231
Philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin and Robert Nozick have
urged governments and individuals to takes rights seriously and accord
them a meaningful and important role in decisions that impact the
interests of individuals. 232 However, as has been noted by H.L.A. Hart,
the foundation of rights (despite the prominence of such interests)
remains obscure:
It cannot be said that we have had . . . a sufficiently detailed or
adequately articulate theory showing the foundation for such rights and
how they are related to other values . . . . Indeed the revived doctrines
of basic rights are . . . in spite of much brilliance still unconvincing. 233

The paradox of rights is also noted by Campbell: “the idea of human
rights is at this time so well accepted and internationally utilised that it is

229.
230.
231.
232.

See Bagaric, In Defence of a Utilitarian Theory of Punishment, supra note 72, at 121-43.
Id.
See L.W. SUMNER, THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF RIGHTS (1987).
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); ROBERT NOZICK,
PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS (1981).
233. H. L. A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 195 (1983).
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difficult to acknowledge just how flimsy are its political foundations.” 234
The scope and relative ranking of rights is almost intrinsically
uncertain. It is for this reason that rights-based claims are almost
inherently contestable and devoid of clear answers. In the prison setting,
there is no evaluative tool that can be invoked to readily determine
whether, for example, the interests of prisoners in enjoying a relatively
high standard of health care and freedom from social isolation outweighs
the interests that prison officials have in ensuring high levels of personal
security and the capacity to administer prisons in a financially efficient
manner. Given that the content, scope, and ranking of rights is inherently
contestable, rights claims can be often summarily defeated by the stroke
of a (judicial) pen. 235
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia has been heavily criticized for his tough stance
against offenders, especially in relation to his interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment. Ostensibly, this is justified in relation to the proportionality
principle, given that he is one of only two justices to hold that it is not a
component of the Eighth Amendment. However, based on the orthodox
understanding of the nature of the proportionality principle, Justice
Scalia’s stance in this regard is sound. He was correct to note that
proportionality is associated with retributive theories of punishment and
that it is so nebulous as to be incapable of being applied in an intelligible
manner. Moreover, proportionality can logically be subsumed totally by
the pursuit of other sentencing objectives. In order to contradict Justice
Scalia’s position on proportionality, it is necessary to justify the role of
proportionality within a non-retributive punitive construct and to inject
content into both limbs of the proportionality thesis. We have previously
advanced theories which seek to accomplish this, and if valid, they
logically undermine the approach by Justice Scalia. However, given the
conservative and originalistic orientation that Justice Scalia adopted in
his judicial writing, his position that proportionalism is not grounded in
the Eighth Amendment is logically and jurisprudentially correct.
In relation to prisoners’ rights, Justice Scalia was influential in
imposing a second limb into the test for establishing breach of the Eighth
234. TOM D. CAMPBELL, THE LEGAL THEORY OF ETHICAL POSITIVISM 164 (1996).
235. In this respect, we refer to rights claims in the conventional manner in which they are
understood, i.e., against the backdrop of a deontological ethic. While, rights grounded in a utilitarian
theory of morality have a potentially firmer foundation, however, this is not the context in which
most contemporary rights claims are asserted. See Bagaric, In Defence of a Utilitarian Theory of
Punishment, supra note 72, at 121-43.
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Amendment. This is doctrinally flawed and thus creates an unnecessary
burden to showing that punishment is cruel. The test for ascertaining
whether prisoners’ rights have been violated is doctrinally flawed
because of a flawed approach to the meaning of punishment—an
approach which fails to acknowledge that extra-curial hardships in the
form of harsh prison conditions are properly classified within the scope
of this term. However, this is not the sole reason for the underutilization
of this potential protection of prisoners’ rights. The objective standard
has been interpreted very strictly, and the rights of prisoners have been
arguably too readily trumped by the perceived demands and
requirements of prison security.
Thus, in relation to the proportionality principle, both philosophy
and an underlying coherency in the approach to statutory and
constitutional interpretation support the position adopted by Justice
Scalia. The contrary is the situation in relation to Justice Scalia’s
position on prisoners’ rights. However, the criticism of Justice Scalia
regarding his approach to Eighth Amendment issues in the context of
prisoners’ rights has been overstated. The views he espoused in this
context are shared by the majority of the Supreme Court. From the
perspective of interpreting the Eighth Amendment in a manner which
would result in a moderate or lenient approach to the punishment of
offenders, Justice Scalia was a foe of criminal law and procedure.
However, his judgments in this context reveal he was a friend to
adopting a rigorously consistent conservative approach (non-outcome
driven) to statutory and constitutional interpretation. It is for readers to
determine which of these imperatives is of the higher order.
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